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1 Introduction
Informed principal problems are adverse selection problems where the principal, who pro-
poses a contract to an agent, has private information. Important examples are rms with
private information about projects who seek nance from competing lenders, or managers
with private information who have bargaining power when dealing with shareholders. In-
formed principal problems may also be important for the analysis of regulated privatization
when the government has better information about the productivity of its asset, or for the
analysis of regulation of a monopolistic FDI when the government has superior information
about the characteristics of the domestic market.
Di¤erent types of the informed principal may o¤er di¤erent contracts, and hence the
choice of a contract itself becomes a signal to the agent regarding the principals type.
This gives rise to an inference process that a¤ects the agents incentives and willingness to
accept the contract. Consequently, informed principal problems are signicantly harder
to understand than models where only the agent has private information. This di¢ culty
arises in particular in the case of the so-called common value problems, where typically the
optimum for the principal under complete information is not incentive compatible when
the principal has superior information.1 In this paper we are primarily interested in the
less studied case of common values,2 and we restrict attention to a natural extension of
the canonical adverse selection model that allows for common values. For a discussion of
the relevance of common value problems, we refer the reader to the excellent discussion in
Maskin and Tirole (1992).
Di¤erent ways of resolving the conict between the principals types regarding the
contract o¤er has given rise to di¤erent solution concepts. For our framework, the two main
solutions are the neutral optimum and the RSW (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson) allocation.
The neutral optimum, introduced by Myerson (1983), is a strong renement motivated by
1In the case of private values, i.e. when the principals private information does not directly a¤ect the
agents utility, it is typically possible to nd, at least when utilities are quasi-linear, mechanisms that (a)
are e¢ cient among the di¤erent types of the principal when the agents beliefs coincide with her priors,
and (b) give the agent an expected payo¤ at least as high as his outside option, even if the agent knew
the type of the principal,. For the case of private values we refer to Maskin and Tirole (1990), and the
recent works of Cella (2008) and Mylovanov and Tröger (2012) together with the literature they cite.
2A common values environment has also been studied in Maskin and Tirole (1992) and Severinov
(2009). The results in the latter work do not apply here, because we focus on problems with one agent,
which is ruled out by assumption in Severinov (2009).
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various cooperative and non-cooperative solution concepts, which makes it a compelling
solution concept. The RSW allocation, studied by Maskin and Tirole (1992) in terms of
informed principal problems, is the least-costly-allocationthat has been emphasized in
the signaling and screening literature because it is prior-free (i.e. it only depends on the
support of the prior) and survives the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Its
importance for informed principal problems is that, if o¤ered, it will be (weakly) preferred
over the outside option by the agent regardless of his/her beliefs.
This paper contributes to this literature by introducing a novel solution concept, the
assured allocation, which is shown to possess a number of attractive properties. The
assured allocation exists, is unique and, in contrast to the RSW, is continuous in the priors
of the agent, even if the probabilities of some types go to zero. Moreover, it can easily be
interpreted. Namely, the assured allocation guarantees for each possible type the surplus
he could have attained, had there been no other types with higher productivity, conditional
on the same being true for all types of lower productivity.3 The assured allocation is an
undominated mechanism, i.e. e¢ cient among the di¤erent types of the principal when
the agents interim participation constraint must be satised, amongst all deterministic
mechanisms. If there is no bunching in the assured allocation, then we can show that the
assured allocation is undominated also amongst all randomizing mechanisms.
The assured allocation weakly dominates the RSW allocation. It coincides with the
RSW allocation when the latter is undominated. A similarity between the assured alloca-
tion and the RSW is that both can be calculated recursively via a sequence of optimization
problems for the di¤erent types.
We know from Maskin and Tirole (1992) that an equilibrium selection issue arises in
their mechanism-selection game when the RSW allocation is dominated: all allocations
that weakly dominate it are perfect Bayesian equilibria, and so the assured allocation
is always such an equilibrium.4 When there are only two types we can show that the
assured allocation coincides with the core mechanism as dened in Myerson (1983). This
provides a very strong equilibrium selection argument in favor of the assured allocation,
3The assured allocation can be understood as a solution to a principal-agent problem where the outside
option varies with the type, as in Jullien (2000). In our case the outside options are, however, dened
endogenously.
4For related work see Ma (1994) and von Thadden (1995).
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and emphasizes the importance of the assured allocation for the case of two types.
However, the above result cannot be extended to the case of more than two types.
Therefore, one might ask whether there exists a game of which the assured allocation is
the unique equilibrium outcome. This is a very hard question to tackle in its full generality
in informed principal problems with common values. Nevertheless, we can show that there
is an extensive form game for which the assured allocation can be an equilibrium, when the
RSW is not. This game draws on the insurance literature. It has competing uninformed
parties simultaneously posting contracts and subsequently deciding whether to withdraw
their contracts, before the informed party chooses, given available contracts, who to trade
with and under what terms.5 We know from the insurance literature (e.g. Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976)) that the RSW allocation will not survive such a competitive process if high
types in our set up (low risk types in the insurance model) are very likely: a protable
pooling contract that dominates the RSW allocation will be introduced attracting thus
all high types. In this paper, we show, on the other hand, that the assured allocation
will survive such a competitive process if priors are also such that the agent makes prots
only from the highest type under the assured allocation. Crucially, this set of priors
is non-empty. This nding is a generalization of related results in Myazaki (1977) and
Spence (1978) who study Wilsons anticipatory equilibria(Wilson (1977)): the former
does so in the context of a labor market with two types that ts our framework, while the
latter does so in a multi-type insurance model that does not t our set up.6 This weak
implementation result adds, we believe, signicantly to the value of the assured allocation.
It provides, alongside the fact that the assured allocation dominates the RSW allocation,
an equilibrium selection argument in favour of the assured vis-a-vis the RSW allocation
when there are more than two types. This equilibrium selection argument is reinforced by
the fact that the assured allocation is shown to be a neutral optimum under conditions
that are similar to those in Jullien (2000) and imply that there is no bunching in the
assured allocation. Given our aforementioned weak implementation result, the assured
allocation might also be useful in understanding outcomes in competitive markets with
adverse selection.
5A similar game is investigated in Hellwig (1987).
6See also the more recent study of a two-type insurance model in Diasakos and Koufopoulos (2009).
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Neutral optima are in general very di¢ cult to calculate in practice, which is possibly one
reason why there are very few applications using this solution concept.7 Uniqueness of the
neutral optimum is also not generally known. We regard it hence as a major contribution
of this paper that we can show that the assured allocation is a neutral optimum under
conditions ruling out bunching, and that neutral optimum and assured allocation coincide
when there are only two types.8 However, neutral optimum and the assured allocation do
not coincide in general. In fact, we provide an example of three types where the assured
allocation involves bunching between the various types and is dominated by a randomized
mechanism, and hence is not a neutral optimum.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and
the weakest assumptions for which we know our analysis to hold. Section 3 introduces the
assured allocation and derives some basic properties. Section 4 discusses some examples
of the assured allocation, and it demonstrates a case when the assured allocation involves
bunching and is not a neutral optimum. Section 5 reviews a number of central concepts
in the literature, and compares the assured allocation with the RSW allocation and the
neutral optimum. Section 6 discusses a particular extensive-form game for which the
assured allocation is, in contrast to the RSW allocation, always an equilibrium. Section 7
concludes. Proofs omitted from the main text are given in the appendix.
2 The Model
We will be focusing on a model of a producer/seller and a buyer, in a broad sense, where
the producers cost-e¢ ciency/productivity typeis her private information. We assume
quasi-linear preferences and a nite type set,9 and that all types of the producer have the
7The only applications we know of are the discussion of the lemon problem in Myerson (1985) and the
extended liability problem discussed in Balkenborg (2006), which are both common value problems. Both
problems do not fall into our framework. Applications to bargaining problems with two-sided incomplete
information are also given in Myerson (1984) and Darrough and Stoughton (1989).
8Other papers characterizing neutral optima are Mylovanov and Tröger (2012), Cella (2008) and
Severinov (2009). Mylovanov and Tröger (2014) and Cella (2008) do this in the private value context.
9See also Severinov (2009) and Mylovanov and Tröger (2012). A nite type set is also used by Myerson
(1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1992), and so we adopt the same assumption to facilitate comparisons.
Note, however, that the general framework of Maskin and Tirole (1992) does not require quasi-linearity.
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same outside option.10 We also allow for common values: the buyers utility depends on
the sellers productivity type. The model we focus on is the canonical model of adverse
selection used, for instance, in the textbook La¤ont and Martimort (2002), Chapters 2
and 3.1, except that we allow for common values and assume that the informed seller is
the side with full bargaining power. As we will explain at the end of this section, this
model di¤ers qualitatively from the standard insurance model; e.g. Stiglitz (1977) and
Spence (1978). The model we work with ts the example in Maskin and Tirole (1992) of
an uninformed rm owner and an informed manager who interact to determine the latters
output and compensation.
The seller (the principal) produces q  0 units of a product at a total cost which
depends on output and the sellers cost-e¢ ciency type. Let the nite type set be, without
loss of generality, the set of numbers N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. The production cost of q units by
type i 2 N is denoted by Ci (q) ; which is a twice continuously di¤erentiable function. We
denote the prior probability of type i, 1  i  N , by si. In the following, let fi 
Pi
j=1 sj;
with the convention that f0 = 0: The type of the seller is his private knowledge and the
distribution of types is common knowledge.
Costs and marginal costs are non-decreasing in q, i.e.
C 0i  0, C 00i  0
for all i 2 N and q  0. They are also decreasing in the type, i.e. if i < j then
Cj (q) < Ci (q) for q > 0
C 0j (q) < C
0
i (q) for q  0
The latter is a sorting condition that ranks types according to their marginal utility from
trade. It states that higher (i.e. more productive) types value trading with the agent more.
The value of the product of type-i seller to the buyer (the agent) is Si (q) ; which is a
twice continuously di¤erentiable function. The value of the product is non-decreasing and
10Therefore, our model is not suitable to investigate the problem of insurance (see Stiglitz (1977) and
Maskin and Tirole (1992)) or of franchising (see Maskin and Tirole (1992)).
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the marginal value non-increasing in the level of output:
S 0i  0 S 00i  0
for all i 2 N and q  0. In the case of independent values, Si (q) is independent of i. As
we are primarily interested in the case of common values, we assume that the value of the
product is non-decreasing in sellers type. Thus, if i < j then
Sj (q)  Si (q) for q  0
This assumption simply says that higher types (who have lower costs) are more productive.
It is used in the proofs of all our theorems, except Theorem 2.
The net surplus is concave
S 00i < C
00
i
In addition, we assume that:
lim
q!1
(SN (q)  CN (q)) =  1
which ensures that optimal output levels are always nite. Fixed costs are not too high:
S1(0)  C1(0)
We also assume that there are gains from trade (allowed to be zero for the lowest type),
which are increasing in the sellers type:
S 0i (0)  C 0i (0)
S 0j (q)  C 0j (q) > S 0i (q)  C 0i (q) for i < j, q  0:
These conditions imply that the participation constraints for the various types of the
principal are never binding in the allocations dened and discussed below.11 We therefore
11This follows from the fact that the reservation payo¤ of the principal will be assumed to be zero, and
in the allocations dened below high types will not want to mimic lower types and the lowest type will get
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ignore them in what follows.
To reduce notation clustering, throughout we will use the following notations:
Wi (q) := Si (q)  Ci (q) for 1  i  N
 i (q) := Ci (q)  Ci+1 (q) for 1  i < N
Thus, Wi(q) is the surplus generated from trade between the buyer and a seller of type i
that involves output q. Moreover,  i(q) is the cost-gain in the production of q by having
a seller of type i + 1 instead of type i. Alternatively, it represents the cost disadvantage
the seller of type i would have when mimicking the more productive type i+ 1:
Next, we introduce some more assumptions and discuss the implications of all our
assumptions. So far our assumptions imply that the type-dependent net surplus Wi is a
concave function, and that the full information production level qoi exists, is unique and
non-negative for i = 1 and increasing in type i: In addition, W1 (qo1)  0, and Wi (qoi ) is
increasing in type i: Moreover, each  i(q) is positive for q > 0 and an increasing function
of q. We will also assume that it is (weakly) concave. That is,
Assumption A  00i (q)  0 for all 1  i < N and q  0.
We need Assumption A in order to guarantee that the problem Xn, discussed shortly
when we introduce the assured allocation, is convex for every n.
The principal and the agent are involved in the following three-stage mechanism-
selection game  : First the informed principal o¤ers a mechanism to the agent in a take-
or-leave-it manner. The aim of the mechanism is to x the output q to be produced by
the seller and the transfer t the buyer has to pay in return to the seller. A mechanism is a
set of announcements for the principal and a rule that maps announcements to (possibly
lotteries over) transfer-output pairs.12 The agent must then accept or reject the o¤ered
mechanism. If the agent accepts the mechanism then the latter is executed: the principal
chooses her announcement and the associated transfer-output pair is implemented. We
at least the rst-best surplus. These will be ensuring a positive payo¤ due to the conditions in question.
12Because the agent has no private information, there is no need to include announcements of the agent
into the mechanism.
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assume that the principals and agents reservation payo¤s are zero.13
Most of the work in this literature (e.g. Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole (1992),
Severinov (2009) and Mylovanov and Tröger (2012), Mylovanov and Tröger (2014)) use
the same extensive form game in their study of the informed principal problem (adjusting
for the number of agents and their information). We will restrict attention to perfect
Bayesian equilibria (for a formal denition, see page 8 of Maskin and Tirole (1992)) of the
three-stage game  . For brevity, we will sometimes simply speak of equilibriain what
follows.
Moreover, applying the inscrutability principle in Myerson (1983), Section 3, we restrict
without loss of generality attention to equilibria of the mechanism-selection game   where
all types of the principal propose the same mechanism. The proposal (rst-) stage of game
  is hence uninformative and does not change the prior. Notice thus that there is pooling
at the proposal stage, while there can be separation in the mechanism itself in the sense
that di¤erent types of the principal can produce di¤erent quantities and receive di¤erent
transfers. Following Maskin and Tirole (1992) we focus on nite simultaneous-actions
mechanisms. By the revelation principle for Bayesian games, we have, for any mechanism
o¤ered by the principal and for given beliefs after the mechanism has been o¤ered, that any
equilibrium of the mechanism corresponds to a truthful equilibrium of a direct revelation
mechanism (DRM). In such an equilibrium, the principal simply announces truthfully
her type and the corresponding (stochastic) transfer-output pair is implemented. This
resulting allocation, i.e. prole of (stochastic) transfer-output pairs per type, is the same
with the one arising from the equilibrium of the general mechanism. We therefore focus
on DRMs. Note that an allocation is e¤ectively a DRM.
2.1 Preliminaries
Let a stochastic DRM be denoted with   (i)1iN  ((ti; i(q)))1iN . i(q) denotes a
probability measure over the set of feasible outputs q  0 and describes a randomization
over possible output levels designed for type i as part of the stochastic DRM. In addition, ti
13In the general model of Maskin and Tirole (1992) the reservation utility of the buyer is allowed to be
dependent of the sellers type.
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denotes the net14 transfer from the buyer to the seller of type i: A stochastic mechanism can
in general include a randomization over transfers as well. Due to quasi-linearity of utilities
we can however restrict attention without loss of generality to stochastic mechanisms with
deterministic transfers (ti)1iN (one would only have to replace a randomized transfer
with its corresponding expected transfer).
Because we restrict attention to equilibria where the proposal stage is uninformative
we can write without loss of generality the agents participation constraint along the
equilibrium in terms of the prior:15
NX
i=1
si(
Z
Si(q)di(q)  ti)  0
We will refer to a mechanism that satises the participation constraint as an individually-
rational mechanism. An ex post individually-rational mechanism satises
R
Si(q)di(q) 
ti  0 for all 1  i  N:
Moreover, an allocation  satises incentive compatibility if the following incentive-
compatibility constraints hold:
ti  
Z
Ci(q)di(q)  tj  
Z
Ci(q)dj(q) for all 1  i; j  N (ICi;j)
This simply says that type i prefers option i to any other option j; j 6= i:
We now introduce some essential denitions. First,
Denition 1 A mechanism is feasible if it is incentive-compatible and individually-
rational.
More generally we will say that a mechanism is feasible given a non-empty subset of
types I  f1; : : : Ng if it is feasible conditional on the agent/buyer holding posterior beliefs
that all possible types belong to I:
We next have:
14Though we allow for net transfers to be negative in the optimal allocation all transfers will be positive.
15Notice, however, that this simplication would be wrong for contracts o¤ered o¤ the equilibrium path.
For our purpose this simplication is without loss of generality because we will not have to consider o¤
equilibrium mechanisms.
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Denition 2 A mechanism is undominated if it is feasible and there does not exist an-
other feasible mechanism which gives every type of the principal at least the same utility
and some of his types a strictly higher utility.
Undominated mechanisms are important because if the principal can e¤ectively com-
municate with the agent, then he should be expected to o¤er only undominated mechan-
isms (see page 1775 of Myerson (1983) for more on this).
A strengthening of the notion of undominated mechanisms is the concept of core mech-
anisms, also proposed by Myerson (1983). To introduce this concept start with a mech-
anism , and consider the alternative mechanism . Let w be the set of winner types in 
compared to . Mechanism  blocks  if it is feasible ("incentive compatible" in Myerson
(1983) jargon) given any superset of w. We then have:
Denition 3 A mechanism  is a core mechanism if there is no alternative mechanism
that can block mechanism .
Unless otherwise stated (e.g. Theorem 2), we restrict attention to deterministic
mechanisms in this paper. Such a DRM is thus an option contract   (i)1iN 
((ti; qi))1iN , where qi denotes the quantity produced and sold by the seller of type i:
16
For expositional simplicity, let us refer, hereafter, with some abuse of terminology, to a
deterministic DRM as, simply, a mechanism or contract or allocation.
Denote the payo¤of the principal of type i under some mechanism  by Ui = ti Ci(qi):
From now on we will, unless stated otherwise, use the substitution Ui = ti   Ci (qi)
and describe a contract as an N -tuple ((Ui; qi))1iN  (mi)1iN  m. Under such
reparametarization, the participation constraint can be re-written as
NX
i=1
si(Wi(qi)  Ui)  0 (1)
This states that the expected surplus must exceed the expected net payments to the seller.
One can also show, following standard steps (see the Appendix), that:
16As usual, for notatiional simplicity, we identify the Dirac measure over output level qi with qi itself.
11
Lemma 1 For a mechanism to be incentive-compatible, it is necessary and su¢ cient that
Ui  Ui+1    i(qi+1) for 1  i < N; (2)
Ui+1  Ui +  i(qi) for 1  i < N: (3)
This Lemma ensures that, when investigating for incentive-compatible allocations, we
can restrict attention to the above constraints. We will be referring to (2) as the (local)
upward incentive (-compatibility) constraint for type i, and to (3) as the (local) downward
incentive (-compatibility) constraint for type i + 1. The former simply says that type i
must receive as much utility as type i+1 minus the cost disadvantage he would have when
imitating the more productive type i + 1. The latter incentive constraint has a similar
interpretation.
Remark 1 The above two local incentive-compatibility constraints imply that
qi  qi+1 for 1  i < N: (4)
This follows directly by summing up the above two incentive constraints and using
the monotonicity properties of  i(q): We will also be referring to (4) as the monotonicity
constraint for i.
Let us consider next the benchmark case of full information where the type of the
principal is common knowledge. In this case, the incentive-compatibility constraints are
irrelevant. The full-information monopoly contract, denoted by mM ; is thus given by
mM = (UMi ; q
M
i )1iN = (W1(q
o
i ); q
o
i ))1iN
where qoi  arg maxq0Wi(q). Notice that the full-information monopoly contract is rst
best in the sense that it maximizes social surplus, and that each type of the principal
receives all the surplus he generates. Note also that qo1  :::  qoN :
We leave this section by highlighting the main di¤erence between our buyer/seller
model and the standard insurance model; e.g. Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1978). Suppose
that the informed party faces the full-information monopoly contract, mM ; and this con-
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tract is not incentive compatible. Then, in our model, the informed party has an incentive
to mimic a type who is associated with higher rst-best full-information output. In the
insurance model, on the other hand, (with higher types being those of lower risk), the
informed party has an incentive to mimic a type who is associated with lower rst-best
full-information output/cover.
3 The Assured Allocation
This work introduces the assured allocation. As we will show, it is an equilibrium of the
three-stage-game  . Our denition is based on a sequence of constrained optimization
problems to be solved inductively. In this sense the computation is straightforward, at
least in comparison to nding a neutral optimum. The main properties of this allocation
and hence its importance for informed-principal problems with common values, and its
relationship with the other known equilibrium allocations will be discussed in Sections 4-6.
To dene the assured allocation, let 1  n  N . Suppose the numbers V1;    ; Vn 1
have been dened. We dene a mechanism (Uni ; q
n
i )1in as the solution to, and the scalar
Vn as the maximal value of, the following constrained optimization problem referred to as
Xn:
Vn  max
(Ui;qi)1in
Un
subject to
Ui  Ui+1    i (qi+1) for 1  i  n  1 (ICi)
qi+1  qi for 1  i  n  1 (MCi)
Ui  Vi for 1  i  n  1 (ACi)
nX
i=1
si (Wi (qi)  Ui)  0 (PC)
We call (Uni ; q
n
i )1in the n-assured allocation.
17 For n = N we speak for short of the
17Note that (PC) can be rewritten as
nX
i=1
sni (Wi (qi)  Ui)  0
where sni =
si
s1++sn .
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assured allocation. We call Vn the assured claim of type n and use it in the denition of
problem Xj, n+ 1  j  N .18
We call the constraints Ui  Vi the assured claim constraints. The rest of the con-
straints are, respectively, the incentive-compatibility constraints that require that every
type i does not have an incentive to mimic type i + 1; 1  i < N   1; the monotonicity
constraints that require output is non-decreasing, and the participation constraint.
We can regard the assured allocation as a process for determining the minimal claim
of a principals type on (expected) net surplus, and then allocating the net surplus over all
types on the basis of these claims. The claim of a particular type is determined iteratively
by deriving the maximum utility that type would have obtained, had it been the highest
type, provided that: (i) the upward incentive constraints of all lower types are satised;19
(ii) output is a non-decreasing function of the type; (iii) all lower types are guaranteed
their claims derived in the previous iterations; (iv) buyer breaks even in expectation.
A crucial assumption of our model is that the benet Si(q) is increasing in the type i:
This implies (see proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix) the following important Extension
property. Consider any contract  = (Ui; qi)1iN that is feasible for given types f1; :::; ng:
Construct the new contract  that gives the same transfer-output pairs to types 1; :::; n
and the transfer-output pair of type n to all higher types. This new contract is feasible
for any given superset of types that contains types f1; :::; ng. This is a direct consequence
of Lemma 1 and the facts that (a) type n and all higher types are bunched, and (b) types
n+ 1; :::; N produce higher net surpluses than type n and so they generate prots for the
agent. This property will be an important building block for most of our proofs.
Another important property that will be used throughout most of the proofs is the
Restriction property. This states that if the assured claim constraint for type k holds
with equality in the n-assured allocation, with k < n, then the restriction of the n-assured
allocation to the rst k types is the k-assured allocation. For more details see Lemma 4
in the Appendix.
The above properties, in conjunction with the fact that the objective in each problem
18The inductive denition presupposes the existence of a solution to the optimization problems Xi for
i = 1;    ; n  1: Theorem 1 below implies that this is indeed true.
19As we will see shortly, satisfying the upward local incentive-compatibility constraints and the mono-
tonicity constraints are enough to ensure feasibility.
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Xi is to maximize the utility of the highest type, imply also that the downward incentive-
compatibility constraints are satised by the solution to problem Xi, for all i = 1; :::; N .
The proof of this is more involved than in standard models of adverse selection because at
the optimum some typesupward incentive constraints may be satised as strict inequal-
ities, while their assured claim constraints be binding.20 Thus, the proof that the assured
allocation is an incentive compatible mechanism is put in the Appendix (see Lemma 6).
Given this and the fact that our main results on the assured allocation are more easily
proved by using the above denition, we chose not to include the downward incentive
constraints in the denition of the assured allocation.
Focusing on the solution of problem XN , rst note that the participation constraint
is binding, i.e. the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multiplier is positive and thus the agent
makes zero prots in the assured allocation. To understand the intuition behind this, note
that if the highest type was not facing the agents participation constraint, then she could
always increase the utility of all types uniformly, and thereby increase her payo¤ in a
an incentive-compatible way. After some straightforward manipulations of the rst-order
conditions of the problem XN , we also have that output qNi is given by
(fi 1   gi 1) 0i 1
 
qNi

+ siW
0
i
 
qNi

+ i 1   i = 0 (5)
where gi 
Pi
j=1 j  fi, 0  0 and N  0, and j  0 and j  0, j = 1; :::; N   1, are
the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the assured claim constraint Uj  Vj and monotonicity
constraint qj+1  qj, respectively (expressed in terms of the multiplier of the participation
constraint). Moreover, the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the (local) upward incentive con-
straint of type i  1 (expressed in terms of the multiplier of the participation constraint)
is
i 1 = fi 1   gi 1 (6)
This is intuitive and follows standard arguments.21 Due to lower types having an in-
20If, on the other hand, the upward incentive constraint for some type i holds as equality, then, as in
standard adverse selection models, the downward incentive constraint for type i+ 1 follows directly from
 0i  0 and the monotonicity constraint qi+1  qi.
21To arrive at (6) simply add up all rst-order conditions with respect to Uj ; j = 1; :::; i  1 and divide
across sides by the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the participation constraint. (5) is then the rst-order
condition with respect qi after dividing by the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the participation constraint and
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centive to mimic higher types, output of each type j maximizes its virtual surplus
(fj 1   gj 1) j 1 (q) + sjWj (q) insofar the monotonicity constraints qj+1  qj  qj 1
are slack. If, however, the monotonicity constraints qk0  :::  qk are binding, i.e.
k > 0; :::; k0 1 > 0; and the monotonicity constraints qk0+1  qk0 and qk  qk 1 are
slack, i.e. k 1 = k0 = 0, then there is bunching between types k; :::; k
0 that involves a
common output level that maximizes the total virtual surplus of all the types in questionPk0
j=kf(fj 1   gj 1) i 1 (q) + siWi (q)g. In any case, the virtual surplus of a type j takes
into account that the assured claim constraints of some of the lower types may be binding,
relaxing thus the information problem vis-a-vis type j.
Note that bunching cannot involve the lowest type, i.e. 1 = 0. If it did, then, by
denition, 1 > 0, and (5) for i = 1 (and using f0   g0 = 0 = 0) would imply that
qN1 < q
o
1. In addition, let j be the maximum type involved in the bunching in question
(and hence j 1 = j = 0 and q
N
1 = ::: = q
N
j ). We have from (5) for i = j that q
N
j  qoj
which leads to a contradiction due to qo1 < q
o
j . Therefore, 1 = 0 and we have from (5)
for i = 1 that qN1 = q
o
1. Trivially, then, V1 = W1(q
o
1). As a corollary we have directly that
there is no bunching when N = 2.
The following Theorem implies that the assured allocation is well-dened.
Theorem 1 The assured allocation exists, is unique and continuous in the prior.
The Extension property discussed above is crucial to obtain admissible mechanisms
for the optimization problem dening the assured allocation. Our concavity assumptions
together with the Restriction property then guarantee uniqueness. Continuity can be
derived using Berges maximum theorem.
The importance of existence is self-explanatory. Uniqueness is a useful property that
will be used in the proof of certain important results (e.g. Theorem 4). The continuity
property is particularly desirable because it implies that the proposed allocation is robust
to small changes in priors, even if the probability of some types goes to zero.
A natural question is what are the e¢ ciency properties of the assured allocation. We
have that:
eliminating i 1 by using (6). For more details see Appendix 7.
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Theorem 2 The assured allocation is undominated within the class of deterministic mech-
anisms. If there is no bunching in the assured allocation then it is undominated within the
class of stochastic mechanisms.
The intuition behind the rst part of the above theorem is that if there was a mechanism
that dominates the assured allocation, then that mechanism would also be admissible for
being the assured allocation, which contradicts its uniqueness. The second part of the
theorem, echoing Strauz (2006), relates the optimality of stochastic mechanisms over the
assured allocation to the presence of non-monotonic production schedules in the latter
allocation.
In Section 5 we will compare in detail the assured allocation with two famous solutions
of informed principal problems with common values: the RSW allocation and the neutral
optima. The latter are undominated mechanisms and, in our environment, the former
allocation has no bunching. One might wonder at this stage whether similar properties
hold for the assured allocation. In Lemma 8 in the Appendix we show that under certain
conditions the assured allocation also has no bunching. In the second part of the next
section we provide an example of an assured allocation with bunching, and show that this
allocation is dominated by a stochastic mechanism.
4 Some Illustrative Examples
4.1 Two Types
Consider the case of two types. Suppose rst that
W1(q
o
1)  W2(qo2)   1(qo2)
In this case, the full-information monopoly contract, mM , is feasible,22 The highest type
cannot ensure a higher payo¤ than UM2 subject to feasibility and assured claim constraints.
Therefore, the assured allocation coincides with the full-information monopoly contract:
22The local downward incentive-compatibility constraints are satised under the full-information mono-
poly allocation. To see this, note that for any i=1; :::; N   1; Wi(qoi ) +  i (qoi ) = Si(qoi )   Ci+1 (qoi ) =
Si+1(q
o
i )  Ci+1 (qoi ) + Si(qoi )  Si+1 (qoi ) Wi+1(qoi+1).
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q2i = q
o
i ; U
2
i = Vi = Wi(q
o
i ); i = 1; 2.
Suppose next that
W1(q
o
1) < W2(q
o
2)   1(qo2)
In this case, the full-information monopoly mechanism is not incentive compatible: the low
productivity type would like to mimic the high productivity type. This implies that the
upward incentive constraint is binding in the assured allocation: U21 = U
2
2    1(q22), and -
by the usual rent-extraction/e¢ ciency trade-o¤ - the output of the high type is distorted
upwards, i.e. q22 > q
o
2. From the participation and upward incentive constraints holding
as equalities, we can derive that V2 = U22 =
s1
s1+s2
[W1(q
o
1) +  1(q
2
2)] +
s2
s1+s2
W2(q
2
2) and
U21 =
s1
s1+s2
W1(q
o
1) +
s2
s1+s2
[W2(q
2
2)   1(q22)]. Moreover, the downward incentive constraint
is satised, i.e. U21 +  1(q
o
1)  U22 , by  01 > 0, the upward incentive constraint holding as
equality and q22 > q
o
2 > q
o
1. Whether the assured claim constraint is slack depends on the
relative likelihood of the two types, s1=s2.
To start with, for su¢ ciently low s1=s2, the information problem is not so severe:
the highest type is less concerned about leaving information rents than distorting (her)
output. This implies that output distortion is not very high, and information rents given
to the low type are su¢ ciently high to ensure that the assured claim constraint is strictly
satised, i.e. U21 > V1 and 
2
1 = 0. Given that V1 = W1(q
o
1) and q
2
1 = q
o
1; we thus have
that the agent is making losses from the lowest type. As s1=s2 increases, the information
problem becomes more severe, and output (of the high type) is further distorted and
information rents left to the low type are reduced. In this range of priors, we have from
(5) for i = 2 (after using 1 = 2 = 0) that q
2
2 = arg maxq0fs1 1(q)+s2W2(q)g. For s1=s2
at least equal to a well-dened threshold information rents cannot be reduced further,
and the assured claim constraint becomes binding, and so U21 = V1(= W1(q
o
1)). In such a
case, we thus have U22 = W2(q
2
2), and production of the high type, q
2
2, is given implicitly
by W1(qo1) = W2(q
2
2)    1(q22).23 That is, the agent breaks even regardless of the type
she faces, and the low type is indi¤erent between the two o¤ered options. Readers who
are familiar with the RSW allocation will immediately recognize that this is the RSW
allocation as characterized in Maskin and Tirole (1992).
23Moreover, 21 is given by solving (5) for i = 2 with respect to 1 (after using 1 = 2 = 0), for the
given output q22 .
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It follows that for s1=s2 low enough so that the assured claim constraint holds as a strict
inequality, the assured allocation dominates the RSW allocation: the highest type selects
the assured allocation instead of the (feasible) RSW contract, attaining thus a higher
payo¤ than under the RSW mechanism, while, as we have already noted, the utility of
the lowest type is greater than her full-information monopoly payo¤, which coincides with
her payo¤ in the RSW allocation. Our Theorem 3 in Section 5.2 is a generalization of this
result for any N .
As Theorem 2 above shows the assured allocation is an undominated mechanism. The
argument here where N = 2 is very simple: if there was a mechanism that dominates the
assured allocation, then that mechanism would also be admissible for being the assured
allocation, and the highest type would be able to attain a higher payo¤, which is a contra-
diction. One natural question then is what is the relationship with the Neutral optimum
and the core mechanisms, which are also undominated mechanisms. We establish in The-
orem 4 in Section 5.3 that for N = 2 the assured allocation is the only core mechanism.
Because neutral optima are always core mechanisms (see Theorem 5 in Myerson (1983))
we therefore have that the assured allocation and the neutral optimum coincide when
N = 2.
4.2 Three Types: Possibility of Bunching and Assured Alloca-
tion Di¤ering from Neutral Optimum
Moving to the case of three types makes things very complicated quickly. Bunching in the
assured allocation becomes now a possibility, and neutral optima, the core and the assured
allocations may no longer coincide. The intuition behind this is the following. Consider the
case when both upward incentive constraints are violated at the full-information monopoly
contract. This implies for the assured allocation that production of the two highest types
must be distorted upwards to reduce information rents. Suppose, however, that the upward
distortion in the production of the second-highest type is so high that it makes under-
reporting an attractive option for the highest type. In this case, bunching may emerge in
the assured allocation. Following then similar arguments to Strauz (2006), a stochastic
mechanism may dominate the assured allocation, implying that the latter is not a core
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allocation and hence not a neutral optimum. The next example demonstrates.
First, we construct an example where bunching occurs in the assured allocation.
Let Ci(q) = 8q   i ln(q + 1) and Si(q) = i2 q + ifln(q + 2)   ln(2)g. Moreover,
1 = 4; 2 = 7:8; 3 = 8 with s1 = 0:04; s2 = 0:06 and s3 = 0:9. We thus have that
 1(q) = 3:8 ln(q + 1) and  2(q) = 0:2 ln(q + 1). After some simple calculations, one can
easily verify that qo1 = 0; q
o
2 = 2:3695 and q
o
3 = 2:5616, whereas V1 = W1(q
o
1) = 0 and
W2(q
o
2) = 5:8559 and W3(q
o
3) = 6:5115. Note here that W1(q
o
1) < W2(q
o
2)    1(qo2) and
W2(q
o
2) < W3(q
o
3)    2(qo3). That is, the upward incentive constraints are violated by
the full-information monopoly contract, and so we should expect both upward incentive
constraints to be binding at the assured allocation. We note also that qo3 is very close to
qo2. In addition, s1=s2 is relatively large, so that the upward distortion of production of
the second highest type is relatively large. Moreover, (s1 + s2)=s3 is close to zero, so that
the upward distortion of production of the highest type is very small. These last three
facts provide conditions for bunching, as we will see next. This example will also be used
in our discussion in Section 6 of a particular extensive form game for which the assured
allocation is an equilibrium, while the RSW allocation is not.
For these parameters, we have that the assured allocation when only the two lowest
types are present, with priors s1=(1  s3) and s2=(1  s3), is given by q21 = qo1; q22 = 3:0457,
U21 = 0:0108 > V1 and U
2
2 = V2 = 5:5039. This is di¤erent than the RSW allocation where
q2 = 3:2442. Note that q22 is given by (5) for i = 2, after using 0 = 1 = 1 = 0). To
demonstrate the optimality of bunching when N = 3, consider the solution (denoted by
tildas) to problem ~X3, which is as problem X3; except that it ignores the monotonicity
constraints. This is the solution to problem X3 after simply setting in the corresponding
Lagrangian 1 = 2 = 0. In this example, we have both upward incentive constraints
being binding, and both assured claim constraints being slack. We thus have from (5) for
i = 2 that eq32 = q22. Moreover, we have from (5) for i = 3 that eq33 = 2:5677. Note that
in this case, using the binding participation and upward incentive constraints, we deriveeU31 = 0:8706 > V1 and eU32 = 6:1818 > V2. Therefore, 1 = 2 = 0 and i = fi; i = 1; 2; are
indeed part of the solution of ~X3. Obviously, this is a solution to problem ~X3, but not to
problem X3 because it violates the monotonicity constraint q2  q3. In other words, this
mechanism is not feasible because it violates the downward incentive constraint for type
20
i = 3. Consequently, there is bunching in the assured allocation, i.e.
q32 = q
3
3 = q  arg max
q0
f(s1 + s2) 2(q) + s3W3(q) + s1 1(q) + s2W2(q)g = 2:59869220515
Using the binding upward incentive constraints and participation constraint we also have
that U31 = 1:3074 > V1 and U
3
2 = 6:1736 > V2; that is, the assured claim constraints are
slack under bunching in this example.
Interestingly, the highest type might be able do better than in the above assured alloc-
ation with bunching by using a randomized mechanism. The reason echoes the arguments
in Strauz (2006). In more detail, by using an appropriate randomized mechanism, the
highest type may be able to separate herself from the second highest type by means of
relaxing her (downward) incentive constraint. This can be achieved here because, in our
example, risk aversion is increasing with productivity, and hence introducing more risk
in type 20s output makes the latters output-utility pair less attractive to type i = 3.
Moreover, such a mechanism may also be designed to generate more expected net surplus
and hence prots to the agent, which can then be distributed in a lump-sum way to the
various types.
Specically, consider a stochastic mechanism that gives the same expected utility and
deterministic output to types i = 3 and i = 1, and the same expected utility to type
i = 2, while o¤ering a stochastic output to type i = 2, such that incentive compatibility
is maintained and the expected net surplus produced by type i = 2 goes up. That
is, denoting with Ui; the expected utility of type i; assume that Ui = U3i ; i = 1; 2; 3;
q3 = q, q1 = qo1. Assume also that the lottery over q2 is such that EW2(q2) > W2(q)
and E 2(q2)   2(q): The former says that the expected net surplus is higher, and the
latter implies that the downward incentive constraint of type 3 is (weakly) relaxed, in the
randomized mechanism. Finally, if the lottery over q2 is such that E 1(q2)   1(q); then
the upward incentive constraint of type 1 is still satised in the randomized mechanism.24
24We note that the monotonicity constraints under such a stochastic mechanism are E 2(q2)   2(q)
and  1(q
o
1)  E 1(q2). The former is the second of the three inequalities in the main text. Note then
that we require E 1(q2)   1(q) instead of the remaining monotonicity constraint in the constructed
randomized mechanism. The reason is that in the original deterministic mechanism the upward incentive
constraint for type 1 is binding, which implies that the corresponding constraint in the stochastic mech-
anism in question (where expected utilities are kept the same across mechanisms) is satised if only if
E 1(q2)   1(q). Note that if E 1(q2)   1(q) (which is the last of the three inequalities in question in
21
If such a mechanism exists, then the highest type can choose an alternative stochastic
mechanism that takes some of the excess net surplus (prot of the agent in this case) and
distribute it uniformly to all types in the form of utils. This is clearly feasible and makes
the highest type strictly better o¤. In summary, the assured allocation (with bunching) is
dominated by a stochastic mechanism if we can nd a lottery over q2 such that
E 1(q2)   1(q)
EW2(q2) > W2(q)
E 2(q2)   2(q)
To demonstrate the existence of such a lottery, consider the binary lottery that gives
q2 = qL with probability  and q2 = qM with probability 1   , with qL < q < qM . In
terms of our example, it turns out that the rst and third inequalities are satised if and
only if  = ln(qM+1) ln(q+1)
ln(qM+1) ln(qL+1) ; for any given qM ; qL and the given q. Therefore, the problem
in hand boils down to nding values for qM and qL such that EW2(q2) > W2(q) holds.
This is written (in terms of our example) as
ln(qM + 1)  ln(q + 1)
ln(qM + 1)  ln(qL + 1) >
(qM   q)(4:1) + (7:8)fln(q + 1)  ln(qM + 1) + ln(q + 2)  ln(qM + 2)g
(qM   qL)(4:1) + (7:8)fln(qL + 1)  ln(qM + 1) + ln(qL + 2)  ln(qM + 2)g
One can verify that this inequality is satised for qL = 2:598692205125 and qM =
2:5986924650177,25 which completes our construction.
The assured allocation in this example is not a core mechanism, and thereby is di¤erent
from neutral optimum (seen Myerson (1983)). One may wonder what is the relationship
between the assured allocation and neutral optima when N > 2 if there is no bunching
in the assured allocation. We show in Theorem 5 that in the absence of bunching, the
assured allocation is a neutral optimum.
the main text), then q > qo1 and  
0
1(q) > 0 imply the remaining monotonicity constraint.
25The left hand side equals 0.9999118075 and the right hand side equals 0.9999118031. Note also that
qL < q < qM :
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To facilitate further understanding of the assured allocation we will compare it next
with two famous solutions of informed principal problems with common values: the RSW
allocation and the notion of neutral optimum, and by doing so we will derive our main
results, Theorems 3 - 6.
5 The RSW Allocation, Neutral Optima and the As-
sured Allocation
We rst need to introduce some denitions and review the concepts of RSW and the
neutral optima.
5.1 Safe and Strong Mechanisms
Adjusting the denitions of a safe mechanism and a strong solution in Myerson (1983) to
the way we set up the model here, we have:26
Denition 4 A mechanism is safe if it is incentive-compatible and ex post individually
rational.
Thus, a safe mechanism is a truth-telling mechanism that the agent is willing to accept
to play when she/he knows the principals type. The principal can successfully implement
a safe mechanism as it is feasible regardless of what the agent can infer about the principal
who o¤ers such a mechanism.
Denition 5 A mechanism is a strong solution if it is safe and undominated.
A strong solution is an important mechanism because, as Theorem 1 of Myerson (1983)
emphasizes, if such a mechanism exists then the principal should implement it despite the
fact that he may strictly prefer (given his true type) another feasible mechanism. The
reason is that if the agent infers that the principals type belongs to the set of types
that strictly prefer this alternative mechanism to the strong solution, then the former
26See page 1772 of Myerson (1983) for how to interpret our model in his framework.
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mechanism violates the agents individual rationality given these posterior beliefs on the
part of the agent.
Though compelling as a solution concept, a strong solution often does not exist. Re-
calling Theorems 1 and 2, we have that the assured allocation is a mechanism which,
like neutral optima, extends the notion of a strong solution in such a way that a solution
always exists and is undominated, but not necessarily safe. The RSW allocation, reviewed
next, extends, on the other hand, the notion of a strong solution in such a way that a
solution always exists and is safe, but not necessarily undominated.27 This highlights the
fundamental di¤erence in the concepts of RSW and the assured allocations.
5.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and the RSW and Assured Al-
locations
The RSW allocation has been studied in terms of the three-stage game   by Maskin and
Tirole (1992). Their Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 will be used here to yield Propositions
1 and 2 below. The following two Remarks facilitate the use of their Proposition 2 and
Theorem 1 in our set up.
Remark 2 An undominated mechanism is called an interim e¢ cient allocation in Maskin
and Tirole (1992).
Remark 3 Our model satises the Sorting Assumption on page 5 of Maskin and Tirole
(1992) and the assumptions in their footnote 19, except that we restrict q to be nonnegat-
ive. However, even with this restriction, Propositions 2, 4(a) and 5 of Maskin and Tirole
(1992) still hold. Thus, the RSW allocation is deterministic and the hypothesis of their
Theorem 1 is satised as long as RSW exists (see their Remark 3 after their Theorem 1).
In terms of our model, Proposition 2 in Maskin and Tirole (1992) can then be stated
as:
27An extreme example occurs in the model of lender liability studied in Balkenborg (2006) when the
informed borrower has all the bargaining power. In the trivial cases where the liability is so low that the
borrower can pay it herself, the RSW allocation is a strong solution. In the economically interesting case
where the lender has to pay some of the liability, the RSW typically gives all the surplus to the lender,
regardless of the type of the borrower. The RSW is dominated by any feasible allocation in that model.
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Proposition 1 The RSW allocation
  
URSWi ; q
RSW
i

1iN is the solution to Programs
(RSWn) dened inductively for n = 1;    ; N as follows:
max
(Un;qn)
Un
subject to
URSWn 1  Un    n 1 (qn) provided n > 1
Wn (qn)  Un
In particular, the allocation satises Wn (qn) = Un and qn < qn+1:
Remark 4 Given our assumption on Wi and  i the solution to this problem exists and
is unique. Recalling the above Remark, we thus have that the hypothesis of Maskin and
Tirole (1992) Theorem 1 is automatically satised.
In contrast to the assured allocation, the RSW allocation is not continuous in priors.
To see this, consider the case of N = 2. In our set-up here we have directly that if the full-
information monopoly contract mM is not incentive compatible, then the RSW allocation,
denoted by mRSW , is given by
mRSW1 =
 
URSW1 ; q
RSW
1

= (W1(q
o
1); q
o
1)
and
mRSW2 =
 
URSW2 ; q
RSW
2

=
 
URSW1 +  1
 
qRSW2

; W 12
 
URSW2

That is, the low-type seller attains her full-information monopoly option, while the high-
type sellers option is such that the low type is indi¤erent between the two options and the
buyer makes zero prots from each and every type. Note that qRSW2 > q
o
2: Consequently,
there is a discontinuity in the allocation when the prior probability on the low type goes
to zero. Namely, the allocation for the high type jumps frommRSW2 to the full-information
monopoly allocation mM2 .
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The RSW allocation is the least-cost-separating allocationwhich has received much
attention in the signaling and screening literature. Its importance in our set up can be
understood by noticing that it is a safe mechanism. Therefore, any type of the principal can
guarantee her RSW payo¤. Consequently, the principals utility prole that corresponds
to the RSW allocation is a lower bound for the equilibrium utility prole of the principal.
Moreover, if there exist beliefs on the part of the agent after observing a deviation from the
RSW allocation that ensure the absence of a protable deviation, then the RSW allocation
is an equilibrium of the three-stage game  : This is dealt with in Theorem 1 of Maskin
and Tirole (1992). The following proposition is an application of the latter Theorem to
our setting (recall our Remark above).
Proposition 2 (Maskin and Tirole) A feasible mechanism ((Ui; qi))1iN is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium allocation of the three-stage game   if and only if it gives each type of
the principal at least his utility in the RSW allocation. In particular, if the RSW allocation
is undominated, then it is the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation.
Recalling the denition of a strong solution, we clearly have that if the RSW allocation
is undominated then it is a strong solution. In fact, combining the above two propositions
with Theorem 1 in Myerson (1983) we show in the Appendix that:
Proposition 3 A strong solution exists if and only if the RSW allocation is undominated.
Therefore, if a strong solution does not exist, then the RSW allocation is dominated and
an equilibrium selection problem arises for the mechanism selection game  . In our rst
example in Section 4 the RSW allocation is indeed dominated by the assured allocation,
and hence the latter is an equilibrium of game  . We generalize this nding in our second
main result:
Theorem 3 The assured allocation weakly dominates the RSW allocation.
The intuition is as follows. As it is shown in the proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix,
the RSW allocation for every group of rst k types is admissible for the k-assured alloca-
tion. Therefore, the utility of every type under the RSW allocations is at most as high as
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the types assured claim, with the latter being by denition a lower utility bound on what
types can obtain in the assured allocation.
Theorems 1 and 3 and Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the unique assured allocation
tracks in a continuous (and computable) way an equilibrium outcome of the game   which
is undominated amongst deterministic mechanisms and coincides with the strong solution
whenever the latter exists (and hence with the RSW allocation).
Comparing the RSW and the assured allocations as equilibria of the game  , whenever
a strong solution does not exist and hence equilibrium selection is an issue in game  ,
note rst that the principal can successfully implement the RSW allocation because it
is a safe mechanism, and so it is feasible regardless of what the agent can infer about
the principal who o¤ers such a mechanism. Importantly, however, the assured allocation
strictly dominates the RSW allocation. Therefore, following the discussion in Myerson
(1983), if the principal could communicate e¤ectively with the agent, then the assured
allocation, and not the RSW allocation, could be one mechanism o¤ered by the principal.
Second, note that Theorem 1 implies that if a sequence of priors converges to the
distribution which puts all mass on one type, then the assured allocation converges to the
full-information monopoly optimum for this type. This is in sharp contrast to the RSW
allocation which is prior-independent for a given set of types, but can jump discontinuously
if the prior probability on a type goes to zero, as we have discussed earlier. Accordingly,
the assured allocation is a more robust equilibrium in such changes of the prior beliefs.
However, because the RSW is prior independent for a given set of a priori possible types
it could be robust implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005).28 The
RSW yields in our set up the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) (see Proposition 7 and, for the intuition, Figure 4
and the discussion surrounding it, in Maskin and Tirole (1992)). Yet, as already noted,
for instance, by Cho and Sobel (1990) in the conclusions in their paper, the intuitive
criterion and related renement concepts are not continuous and have the drawback of
28Proving that it is may not merely be a direct application of the results recently derived in Bergemann
and Morris (2005), Bergemann and Morris (2008) and the literature they cite. The reason is that in our
framework the designer herself has private information. Therefore, rstly, an o¤ered mechanism may have
some informational content and, secondly, the type space of the agent will include her prior beliefs about
the principals payo¤ type, and the type space of the principal will include the prior beliefs of the principal
about the agents prior beliefs.
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being sensitive to small changes in the extensive form. A related issue is discussed shortly
in Section 6.
Our discussion highlights that an understanding of the robustness properties of mech-
anisms and equilibrium renement, on one hand, and how these interact with e¢ ciency
and continuity, on the other, is very important. However, it is out of the scope of the
current work and must be left for future research. In this paper we will not take a stance
on the relative importance of these properties. We do not claim that the assured allocation
must be preferred against all other allocations when the RSW allocation is dominated (by
the assured allocation). Our contribution in this paper is instead to provide an easily in-
terpreted algorithm for an undominated allocation which is an equilibrium for the 3-stage
game in Maskin and Tirole (1992) and, under some conditions discussed next, a neutral
optimum. We leave it to the researchers and practitioners to choose which of these two or
other allocations to focus on.
5.3 The Neutral Optimum and the Assured Allocation
Neutral optimum is an axiomatically founded solution concept (Myerson (1983)) that
always exists in environments with nite outcome and type spaces. It cannot be eliminated
by any reasonable concept of blocking.29 The neutral optimum is not necessarily a strong
solution itself. To simplify exposition, we do not state here Theorem 7 in Myerson (1983).
However, we will need it in the proof of Theorem 5, in the Appendix, and therefore we
will state it there for completeness.
We turn to the comparison of the assured allocation with the neural optimum.
Theorem 4 If N = 2; then the neutral optimum coincides with the assured allocation and
is the unique core mechanism.
Proof. Note that in any core allocation, the lowest type should be getting at least his
assured claim. If not, compare with the pooling mechanism which requires both types
to produce qo1 and yields utility W1 (q
o
1) to type 1. This mechanism makes zero prots
from the lowest type and positive prots from type 2 (as this type is more productive
than the lowest type). It is also incentive compatible for all types due to pooling, and
29For the original, axiomatic denition see Myerson (1983) or the brief review in Severinov (2009).
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hence it is feasible for any superset of whatever the set of winners is in this alternative
mechanism (which includes i = 1 by construction). Therefore, the alternative mechanism
is a "blocking" mechanism, which contradicts the assumption that the original mechanism
is a core allocation.
We next show that in any core allocation, the highest type should be getting at least
his assured claim. If not, compare with the assured allocation for the two types. As we
have seen in the discussion of the assured allocation for two types in Section 4.1, (see also
Lemma 3 in the Appendix) the agent makes non-negative prots from type i = 2 under
the assured allocation and zero expected prots overall. So this alternative mechanism
satises the participation constraint regardless of the superset of winners (which includes
i = 2 by construction). Thus it blocks the given mechanism.
Recall now that the assured claim of type 2 is by deition the maximum utility type 2
can get conditional on o¤ering a feasible mechanism that gives type 1 at least her assured
claim. Therefore, the assured allocation coincides with the core allocation when N = 2.
The remaining result follows directly from the result in Myerson (1983) that neutral optima
are core allocations, and by the uniqueness of the assured allocation (Theorem 1).
The above result is interesting because, in general, it is very hard to determine the set
of all neutral optima, and often even to nd a single one. However, in the Theorem above
we prove, in e¤ect, uniqueness of the neutral optimum and provide, a simple, computable
characterization of it, when N = 2, via the assured allocation.
The fact that the assured allocation coincides with the core mechanism as dened
in Myerson (1985) provides a very strong equilibrium selection argument in favor of the
assured allocation, when N = 2, and emphasizes the importance of the assured allocation
for the case of two types.
To proceed to our next result, we need to introduce one more assumption, which makes
use of the following denition.
Denition 6 Denote by qi() for  2 [0; fi 1] the maximizer of fi 1 si  i 1 (q) +Wi (q).
Notice that by our previous assumptions the latter function is strictly concave and
hence has a unique maximizer qi()  0 or it is never decreasing. Notice also that qi(fi 1) =
qoi and that qi() is decreasing in  whenever qi() > 0:
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Assumption B : For all 1  i < j  N and  2 [0; fi 1], it holds that qi()  qj(), if
qi() > 0:
Assumption B ensures that there is no bunching in the assured allocation when there
are three types or more. It is used in Theorem 5, but not elsewhere. Assumption B is
often deployed to ensure no bunching in optimal screening problems with type-dependent
outside options. For instance, Assumption B is the counterpart of the Potential Separation
assumption in Jullien (2000). Assumption B is needed here because the assured allocation
is dened by means of an optimal screening problem with type-dependent reservation
utilities. As in Jullien (2000) we can give separate conditions on the priors and the
technology which jointly imply Assumption B. These are provided for completeness in
Lemma 7 in the Appendix.
Theorem 4 provides also the basic motivation behind Theorem 5. Start from the case
with two types. Suppose now that a third, even more productive type of the principal is
added. Then, recalling problemXn in Section 3 for n = N , we dene the assured allocation
for the three types as a feasible mechanism that achieves for the third type the maximal
payo¤ conditional on the lower types getting at least their assured claims, which in turn
are the payo¤s of the lower types if they were the highest types. This construction can
be iterated when more and more types of higher e¢ ciency are added to the model. Recall
now that there is no bunching in the unique assured allocation when N = 2. In Lemma
8 in the Appendix we show that Assumption B implies that there is no bunching in the
assured allocation for any N . Motivated by these ndings, and our discussion in Section
4.2 in particular, that if there is bunching in the assured allocation then it may not be
a a neutral optimum we obtain the nal main result of this paper, which is technically
the hardest to prove.
Theorem 5 Under Assumption B the assured allocation is a neutral optimum.
The result implies in turn that the assured allocation (without bunching) belongs to
the minimal set of unblocked mechanismsas dened in Myerson (1983)). This, alongside
that the assured allocation dominates the RSW allocation when equilibrium selection arises
in game  , provides an equilibrium selection argument in favor of the assured vis-a-vis the
RSW allocation when there are more than two types and no bunching in the assured
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allocation. We do not know whether there exists another neutral optimum which is not
the assured allocation when in the latter there is no bunching. We strongly conjecture
that there are. On the other hand, recalling the second example in Section 4, we know
that when there is bunching in the assured allocation, then the assured allocation may not
be a neutral optimum. This emphasizes that the assured allocation does not in general
coincide with neutral optima.
6 Market Implementation of the Assured Allocation
As Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 imply that the assured allocation is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the three-stage game  , one may wonder whether there is a dynamic process
or game for which the RSW allocation may not be an equilibrium outcome, while the
assured allocation is. If such a game exists, this could provide an additional reason for
selecting the assured, and not the RSW, allocation as a solution to the informed-principal
problem. In this section we provide such a game. In doing so, we also provide an additional
link of the assured allocation with the received literature - in particular, the literature on
markets with adverse selection.
Consider the following game. There is a unit mass of sellers and NB  2 buyers, with
each seller and each buyer conforming to the description of "the seller" and "the buyer"
in Section 2, respectively. Let si represent the proportion of sellers of type i: Types are
the sellersprivate information. The game has the following stages:
 At the rst stage, the uninformed parties (buyers) post simultaneously and independ-
ently incentive-compatible and individually-rational30 deterministic direct mechan-
isms.
 At the second stage, having observed the competitors postings, each buyer can
"withdraw" its contract, i.e. "exit the market", at no cost. Withdrawing a contract
means that the buyer decides not to trade with any seller, and thereby makes zero
prots.
30This is without loss of generality as (a) any contract which is not incentive-compatible for some types
can be replaced by another mechanism where each type is o¤ered instead its preferred option from the
original menu, and (b) any incentive-compatible contract which is not individually-rational for some types
can be replaced by another menu of options where each such type is o¤ered its reservation payo¤.
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 At the last stage, sellers choose an option from the available contracts and trade
does take place (i.e. no further market-exits are allowed at this stage). If no con-
tract is available, i.e. if all buyers have exited the market, then sellers receive their
reservation utilities.
We call this the market game. This game is a modication of the model of an insur-
ance market analyzed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where an exit stage is explicitly
added. The idea behind this extension is to allow buyers to react to possible deviations
by their competitors, introducing thus forces akin to those behind Wilsons "anticipatory
equilibrium" notion.
We restrict attention to priors being such that the assured allocation does not coincide
with the RSW allocation. If it did, then it would be a symmetric pure strategy Perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of the market game; this is a consequence of being,
in this case, a strong solution solution.
We will be referring to type i as "loss-making", if it creates losses for the buyer under
the assured allocation, i.e. if Wi(qNi ) < U
N
i . Conversely, we will be referring to type i as
"prot-making", if it creates positive prots for the buyer under the assured allocation,
i.e. if Wi(qNi ) > U
N
i .
We then have the following important result:
Theorem 6 Assume that priors are such that all types i = 1; :::; N   1 are loss-making.
All buyers posting the assured allocation at the rst stage, with buyers sharing the market
(i.e. each buyer trading with si=NB sellers of type i; for all i) is a symmetric pure strategy
Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of the market game.
Proof. Let us denote the contract that o¤ers the assured allocation with N = 
UNi ; q
N
i
N
i=1
: To prove the existence of an equilibrium where this contract is o¤ered by
all buyers and no buyer exits the market, we assume that in equilibrium sellers who are
indi¤erent between an option from the assured allocation contract and an option from
an alternative contract select the former option. Furthermore, sellers always choose the
option which is designed for them. Moreover, we postulate that after a deviating o¤er by
another buyer, the only buyers who exit are those who would have otherwise made losses.
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We prove the theorem by contradiction, and so suppose that there exists a feasible
deterministic deviation that makes positive prots. Refer to this deviation as contract
d =
 
Udi ; q
d
i
N
i=1
:We will be referring to it simply as the deviation. We will also be saying
that a type is "attracted" by the deviating buyer, if the type (weakly) prefers the option
o¤ered to it in the rst stage by the deviating buyer. Notice that the deviation, being
protable, must have the deviating buyer not exiting the market at the second stage.
Suppose rst that the deviation is such that some non-deviating buyers do not exit the
market. These buyers are not making losses; otherwise they would have also exited the
market. Consider then the mechanism 0 = (U 0i ; q
0
i)
N
i=1 that consists of the options that are
chosen at the last stage by the sellers from all available contracts. That is,
(U 0i ; q
0
i) =
8<:
 
UNi ; q
N
i

if U 0i  UNi 
Udi ; q
d
i

if U 0i < U
N
i
This mechanism is feasible and makes strictly positive prots by construction. It also
satises the assured claim constraints (because no type is worse o¤following the deviation).
This implies that a mechanism 00 that di¤ers from mechanism 0 only in that it o¤ers
every type a su¢ ciently small epsilon more utility is also feasible and makes every type
strictly better o¤. This contradicts the fact that the assured allocation is undominated
amongst all deterministic mechanisms.
Assume now that the deviation is such that all non-deviating buyers exit the market
at the second stage. Since they would have been making losses if they had not exited, it
must be that the deviating buyer attracts some prot-making types. By the description
of the candidate equilibrium, these types are strictly better o¤ with the option o¤ered to
them by the deviating buyer. By assumption, all types i = 1; :::; N   1 are loss-making,
which implies by the properties of the assured allocation that the highest type is the only
prot-making type. Therefore, this type chooses the option
 
UdN ; q
d
N

and UdN > U
N
N :
However, the maximum prots that can arise from any incentive-compatible mechanism
subject to the condition that the utility of the highest type is at least as high as its utility
in the assured allocation is zero.31 Thus, contract d is not a protable deviation, and the
31The proof of this is as follows: recalling Lemma 1 we have that all incentive-compatibility constraints
in the problem in the main text above can equivalently be replaced by the local incentive-compatibility
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proof is comlpete.
A corollary of this theorem is that the assured allocation is an equilibrium of the market
game for all priors, conditional on there being only two types.32 A natural question is
whether there are priors such that all types i = 1; :::; N   1 with N > 2 are loss-making.
The answer is a¢ rmative. In fact, our example in Section 4.2 (of the assured allocation
involving bunching) is such an example. Loosely speaking, the highest type will be the
only type who is not loss-making, if it is very productive (so that all upward incentive
constraints are binding) and is su¢ ciently more likely than all other types (so that the
upward distortion of its output is relatively small). The reason is that in this case, the
information problem will not be very severe and the highest type will be willing to leave
su¢ ciently high information rents to (i.e. cross-subsidize) all types below.
Echoing results in the literature on insurance, we can easily show that the RSW will
not be an equilibrium outcome of the market game for some priors. To see this, consider
momentarily the market game after dropping the second stage. In this game, the RSW is
not an equilibrium outcome when higher types are su¢ ciently more likely than lower types
so that there is a protable pooling contract that attracts all types. This follows directly
from single-crossing and the concavity assumptions about the cost and benet functions.
Figure 1 demonstrates this situation for the case of two types (and linear buyersbenet
functions). This gure is the analogue of the corresponding gure that shows the well
known case when the RSW is not a Nash equilibrium in the insurance market game
(without the second withdrawal stage); see, for instance, Figure III in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). The same is clearly also true for the market game as dened earlier (i.e.
with the second stage), because such a protable pooling contract will attract all types
constraints and the monotonicity constraints. Consider the relaxed problem P that results from the latter
problem after dropping the local downward incentive constraints. Problem P is a well-dened problem.
Note then that the assured allocation and the associated Kuhn-Tucker multipliers (expressed in terms of
the multiplier of the participation constraint) from problem XN is a solution to problem P after using the
inverse of the multiplier of the participation constraint for the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the constraint
UN  UNN in problem P . This follows directly from the fact that for the highest type the assured claim
constraint holds by construction as equality, while for all other types the assured claim constraints hold
as strict inequalities (and hence the corresponding assured allocation Kuhn-Tucker multipliers are zero).
Therefore, maximized prots in problem P are zero. But we know that the assured allocation satises
also the downward incentive constraints. Thus, the solution in problem P is also a solution to the problem
stated in the main text above.
32With two types and the assured allocation being di¤erent than the RSW allocation, the lowest type
is loss-making (recall our discussion in Section 4.1).
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and hence the non-deviating buyers will end up with zero prots and not exit the market.
The same construction can easily be extended to the case of more than one types as long
as the highest type is su¢ ciently more likely than lower types.
Given the above discussion, a very important question, for our purposes, is whether
there are priors such that the above theorem holds and the RSW allocation is not an
equilibrium outcome of the market game. Again, our example in Section 4.2 provides us
with such a case. In that example, one can easily see that there is pooling contract that
strictly dominates the RSW allocation and makes strictly positive prots.33 Therefore,
we can have situations where priors are such that an equilibrium outcome of the market
game is the assured, but not the RSW contract. The existence of a game for which the
33To be precise, such mechanism is the pooling contract ft0 +0:01; q0g where ft0; q0g = f20:3848; 3:273g
is the transfer-output option that would make both types 1 and 3 indi¤erent between this option and their
RSW options. That is, ft0; q0g is the solution to the system of equations ft C1(q) = URSW1 ; t C3(q) =
URSW3 g where URSWi denotes the utility of type i under the RSW allocation. For completeness, we
note that URSWi = Wi(q
RSW
i ); with q
RSW
1 = q
o
1; and q
RSW
2 and q
RSW
3 being dened implicitly by
W3(q
RSW
3 ) =W2(q
RSW
2 ) +  3(q
RSW
3 ) and W2(q
RSW
3 ) =W1(q
o
1) +  2(q
RSW
2 ).
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assured, but not the RSW, allocation is an equilibrium outcome emphasizes the value of
the assured allocation, especially when it dominates the RSW allocation.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a specic deterministic mechanism which we called the assured
allocation. We showed that it exists, and is unique, undominated (amongst deterministic
mechanisms) and robust in small changes in prior beliefs. We also showed that it (weakly)
dominates the RSW and coincides with the RSW only when the latter is undominated.
If the assured allocation is separating it is a neutral optimum, while we have provided an
example where there is bunching in the assured allocation and the latter is not a neutral
optimum. We have also shown that when N = 2 the assured allocation coincides with the
neutral optimum and the core mechanism. Therefore, faced with equilibrium selection in
the mechanism-selection game in Maskin and Tirole (1992), one could choose the assured
allocation as the solution. When N > 2, the latter argument cannot be made as the
assured allocation may not coincide with the core mechanism. We show that when there
is no bunching in the assured allocation, then the latter is a neutral optimum and hence
a subset of the core. We have also shown that in a particular class of market games,
the assured, but not the RSW, allocation is always an equilibrium. These properties,
alongside that the assured allocation dominates the RSW mechanism, could be used to
argue in favor of the assured, and not the RSW, allocation as a solution to informed
principal problems of the type we study here.
One interesting avenue for future work would be to attempt to generalize the concept of
the assured allocation to stochastic mechanisms. This would require a di¤erent approach
than the one we have employed here. We have shown and extensively used that the surplus
attained by each type had it been the highest one, is increasing in the type. However, with
stochastic mechanisms this might no longer be always true. The reason is the following.
It is true that stochastic mechanisms will in general (weakly) increase the surplus of the
highest type, all other things equal. Nevertheless, all other things are not equal. Due to
the recursive nature of dening the assured allocation, the constraints that lower types
attain at least as much as what they would have attained had they been the highest type,
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may also be more stringent when stochastic mechanisms are allowed.
We expect that our analysis extends to more general environments with multiple agents
and interdependent values provided there remains a clear hierarchy of the types of the
principal in terms of attained surplus for contracts which are individually rational and
incentive compatible for all types of the principal and all types of the agents. We leave
this for future research.
It would be interesting to add ex post participation constraints for the agent (i.e. that
he can ex post refuse a contract if the principal decides to take a particular option). Such
model modications, which relax the commitment assumptions used here, could alter the
nature of the assured allocation. One could also allow for type-dependent outside options.
This would enable the investigation of insurance and franchise contracts. Our analysis
does not allow us to handle cases where there is a trade-o¤ between quality and costs. For
our analysis, it is important that higher types are unambiguously preferred by the agent.
However, interesting applications, such as in the procurement of public services, might
require a purchaser who prefers a producer of lower cost-e¢ ciency and higher quality of
produced services. All these are very interesting future research projects.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note, after using the denition of Ui; that the incentive-
compatibility constraints can be re-written, respectively, as
Ui  Uj  
j 1X
v=i
 v(qj) for 1  i < N; i < j  N
Ui  Uj +
i 1X
v=j
 v(qj) for 1 < i  N; 1  j < i
The proof then follows usual arguments. Specically, the necessary part follows directly
because the local incentive-compatibility constraints for types i and i + 1 are a subset of
all incentive-compatibility constraints. Su¢ ciency is obtained as follows. (a) The local
incentive-compatibility constraints for types i and i+ 1 imply
 i(qi+1)  Ui+1   Ui   i(qi)
and so qi  qi+1 by the monotonicity of  i. (b) After forward iteration of Ui  Ui+1  
 i(qi+1) we have Ui  Uj  
Pj 1
v=i  v(qv+1) for j > i. Given  
0
v > 0 and, by monotonicity,
qv+1  qj for i  v < j   1; we get that Ui  Uj  
Pj 1
v=i  v(qj): (c) After backward
iteration of Ui +  i(qi)  Ui+1 we have Uj +
Pi
v=j  v(qv)  Ui+1 for j < i. Given  0v > 0
and, by monotonicity, qv  qj for j < v  i; we get that Uj +
Pi
v=j  v(qj)  Ui+1:
Proofs of Propositions and Theorems 1 - 3
We rst need to prove a number of useful Lemmas. These Lemmas use optimization
problems Xn(y); Xn(y) and eXn(y).
First, problem Xn(y) is derived from problem Xn after replacing the participation
constraint with
Pn
i=1 si (Wi (qi)  Ui) + sny  0 where y  0 (that is, Xn = Xn(0)).
Second, let Xn(y) be the more constrained optimization problem which is derived from
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Xn(y) by adding the downward incentive constraints
Ui+1  Ui +  i (qi) for 1  i  n  1: (DCi;j)
The signicance of this problem comes from Lemma 1 which ensures that a solution to Xn
is a feasible mechanism given the set of types f1; : : : ; ng for the informed principal problem
with n types. We will show in Lemma 6 (stated and proved shortly) that a solution to Xn
is a solution to Xn(0).
Third, let ~Xn(y) be the less constrained problem which is derived from Xn(y) after
dropping all the monotonicity constraints MCi. Problem ~Xn(0) characterizes the assured
allocation if there is no bunching (see Lemma 8). This problem will be used, for instance,
in the proof of Theorem 2.
In both problemsXn(y) and ~Xn(y) the numbers Vi used in the assured claim constraints
are the maximal values U ii from the problem Xi.
As we will see, the Lagrangian for the problemXn(y) plays an important role in proving
Theorem 5. The Lagrangian for the problem Xn (y), with the appropriate multipliers
i; i; i and ; is (with n + n > 0)
L = (n + n)Un +
n 1X
i=1
i (Ui   Vi) +
n 1X
i=1
i (Ui   Ui+1 +  i (qi+1)) (7)
+
n 1X
i=1
i (qi+1   qi) + 
 
nX
i=1
si (Wi (qi)  Ui) + sny
!
:
Notice that (n + n) is a weight on the objective function in the Lagrangian and not,
strictly speaking, a Lagrange multiplier. Normally one would set (n + n) = 1: However,
if one multiplies in a solution to the rst-order conditions for the Lagrangian problem
all multipliers, including (n + n) ; by the same constant, the optimum is not changed.
Rather than xing (n + n) we can hence x any positive Lagrange multiplier at a suitable
value. For us it will be convenient to set  = 1, once we have shown that  must always be
positive. This will ease the comparison between the solutions to the problems Xn (y) and
Xk (0) for k < n below. Note thus that k and k are determined as Lagrange multipliers
for the problem Xn (y) while only their sum is determined in the problem Xk (y) :
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Using 0  0  n  0 we can rewrite the Lagrangian as:
L=
nX
i=1

i +
 
i   i 1
  siUi   n 1X
i=1
iVi + sny (8)
+
nX
i=1

i 1 i 1 (qi) + siWi (qi) +
 
i 1   i

qi

The rst-order conditions are for i = 1;    ; n:
i +
 
i   i 1
  si = 0
i 1 
0
i 1 (qi) + siW
0
i (qi) + i 1   i = 0:
Addition of the former over i yields, since n + n > 0, 0 <
Pn
i=1 i + n = 
Pn
i=1 si.
Hence  > 0; and so the participation constraint of the agent is binding, and therefore
nX
i=1
si (Wi (qi)  Ui) + sny = 0 (9)
From now on we set  = 1.
The rst-order conditions for i = 1;    ; n become:
i +
 
i   i 1
  si = 0 (10)
i 1 
0
i 1 (qi) + siW
0
i (qi) + i 1   i = 0: (11)
Let gi =
Pi
j=1 j; with g0  0. The rst-order conditions with respect to Ui imply, using
fi =
Pi
j=1 sj, that
i = fi   gi: (12)
Denote a solution to optimization problem Xn (y) by (Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y))1in. We de-
note the corresponding multipliers by ni (y), 
n
i (y), and 
n
i (y) : We also write g
n
i (y) =Pi
j=1 
n
j (y). Notice that g
n
i (y) is non-decreasing in i: When there is no danger of con-
fusion we will often drop the (y) or even the superscript n in the solution. We can now
proceed to the various proofs.
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Lemma 2 The participation constraint of the agent is binding in a solution to the problem
Xn (y). Moreover, for each type 1  i < n either the incentive constraint ICi and/or the
assured claim constraint ACi is binding, i.e. i > 0 and/or i > 0.
Proof. The discussion below Formula (8) already showed that the participation constraint
must be binding in an optimum; in particular,  = 1. The second part of the Lemma
follows directly from Formula (10) and that  > 0:
Lemma 3 Suppose type n produces qnn in a solution to Xn. Then
Vn+1  Vn +  n (qnn) and Wn (qnn)  Vn
Proof. Let ((Uni ; q
n
i ))1in be a solution to the program Xn. We have thus by denition
Unn = Vn. Consider now the contract

U^n+1i ; q^
n+1
i

1in+1
for the types 1  i  n + 1
dened by

U^n+1i ; q^
n+1
i

= (Uni ; q
n
i ) for 1  i  n and

U^n+1n+1 ; q^
n+1
n+1

= (Vn +  n (q
n
n) ; q
n
n).
We show now that this contract is admissible for the problemXn+1: Given the denition of
Vn+1; we thus have Vn+1  Vn+ n (qnn). To show admissibility notice rst that the contract
satises by construction all incentive constraints ICi, the monotonicity constraints MCi
and the assured claim constraints ACi.
The participation constraint for the agent is also satised. To see the latter, we prove
rst that Wn (qnn)  Vn must hold. For n = 1 this is clear. For n > 1 we would otherwise
obtain from the participation constraint for the problemXn that
Pn 1
i=1 si (Wi (q
n
i )  Uni ) >
0. So ((Uni ; q
n
i ))1in 1 would be admissible for the problem Xn 1, give utility at least
Vn 1 to type n   1; due to Unn 1  Vn 1 by ACn 1; and have a participation constraint
for the agent which is satised as a strict inequality. However, this means that we have a
solution for problem Xn 1 in which the participation constraint is slack. This contradicts
Lemma 2.
Secondly, we have for any q
Wn+1 (q) = Sn+1 (q)  Cn+1 (q)  Sn (q)  Cn+1 (q)
= (Sn (q)  Cn (q)) + (Cn (q)  Cn+1 (q))
= Wn (q) +  n (q)
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and therefore
n+1X
i=1
si

Wi
 
q^n+1i
  U^n+1i  =
nX
i=1
si (Wi (q
n
i )  Uni ) + sn+1 (Wn+1 (qnn)  (Vn +  n (qnn))) 
sn+1 (Wn (q
n
n) +  n (q
n
n)  (Vn +  n (qnn)))  0
The last inequality uses Wn (qnn)  Vn; derived above. Thus, the participation holds.
Lemma 4 Suppose that in a solution (Uni ; q
n
i )1in to Xn (y) the k-assured claim con-
straint holds with equality for 1  k < n. Then
kX
i=1
si (Wi (q
n
i )  Uni ) = 0. (13)
and the restricted solution (Uni ; q
n
i )1ik is a solution to Xk (0). If, in addition, the assured
claim constraint is satised as a strict inequality at k + 1; then we must have qnk < q
n
k+1,
i.e. there cannot be bunching between types k and k + 1.
Proof. Suppose rst that
Pk
i=1 si (Wi (q
n
i )  Uni ) > 0: Then the restriction ((Uni ; qni ))1ik
of the solution would satisfy all constraints of the problem Xk (0) with the participation
constraint being slack. Since type k receives Vk in this solution, (Uni ; q
n
i )1ik is an optimal
solution of Xk (0) in which the participation constraint is slack. This contradicts Lemma
2.
Suppose next that
kX
i=1
si (Wi (q
n
i )  Uni ) < 0 (14)
Take a solution
  
Uki ; q
k
i

1ik for the problem Xk (0). Consider the new contract dened
by 
U^ni ; q^
n
i

=
8<:
 
Uki ; q
k
i

for i  k
(Uni ; q
n
i ) for i > k
We have
Unk = Vk = U
k
k = U^
n
k : (15)
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The rst equality follows by the assumption of the Lemma, the second by the denition
of Vk and the third by the above construction. Since the participation constraint for
Xn (y) is binding in the optimal contract (Uni ; q
n
i )1in and since the participation con-
straint for Xk (0) is binding in the optimal contract
 
Uki ; q
k
i

1ik, inequality (14) impliesPn
i=1 si

Wi (q^
n
i )  U^ni

+sny > 0: Therefore, the above contract satises the participation
constraint of problem Xn (y) strictly. By construction all assured claim constraints and
all incentive constraints ICi are satised as well as the monotonicity constraints MCi for
1  i  n possibly with the exception of q^nk+1  q^nk . However, also the latter inequality
holds.
To see this, note
Vk +  k
 
q^nk+1

= U^nk +  k
 
q^nk+1
  U^nk+1  Vk+1  Vk +  k  qkk
which implies by the monotonicity of  k that q^
n
k+1  qkk = q^nk . The equality follows from
(15). The rst inequality is ICk after using the denition of the new contract and, once
again, (15). The second inequality combines the denition of the new contract with either
ACk+1 if + 1 < n; or Unn  Vn if + 1 = n: The last inequality follows from Lemma 3.
Therefore,

U^i; q^i

1in
is admissible for the problem Xn (y) with a slack particip-
ation constraint. Since U^nn = U
n
n , it is also an optimal solution for this problem, again in
contradiction to Lemma 2.
Thus the equality (13) must hold. In consequence, (Uni ; q
n
i )1ik is admissible for the
problem Xk (0) and, since Unk = Vk; it is an optimal solution for this problem.
Finally, we prove the second part of the Lemma. Suppose that the assured claim
constraint is satised as a strict inequality at k + 1, i.e. Unk+1 > Vk+1, and that q
n
k = q
n
k+1:
Since qnk is part of a solution to Xk (0), Lemma 3 implies
Unk+1 > Vk+1  Vk +  k (qnk ) = Unk +  k
 
qnk+1

which contradicts the incentive constraint ICk.
Lemma 5 Assume that the solution (Uni ; q
n
i )1in to the optimization problem Xn (y) for
any 1  n  N exists. Then the solution (Uni ; qni )1in to the optimization problem Xn (y)
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is unique. Moreover, the corresponding multipliers ni ; 
n
i and 
n
i as dened above (see
formula (7)) are unique up to the choice of the terms in nn + 
n
n.
Proof. The proof is by induction. The claim is clearly true for n = 1. Suppose it holds
for n  1  1. In the problem Xn (y) let k < n be the largest index for which the assured
claim constraint is binding. That is, nk > 0 and 
n
i = 0 for any k < i  n: (Set k = 0 if
no assured claim constraint is binding. The remaining statements in this paragraph are
then vacuously true.) Let
 
Uki ; q
k
i

1ik be the solution to the problem Xk (0), which is by
assumption unique. Also the Lagrange multipliers ki ; 
k
i , and 
k
i of the latter problem are
unique, up to the choice of the terms in kk + 
k
k. Let (U
n
i ; q
n
i )1in be the solution to the
problem Xn (y), and let ni ; 
n
i , and 
n
i be corresponding Lagrange multipliers. By Lemma
4 (Uni ; q
n
i )1ik is a solution to Xk (0) and by the assumed uniqueness we have U
n
i = U
k
i
and qni = q
k
i for 1  i  k. From denition of k and the second part of Lemma 4, we know
that MCk is slack, i.e. nk = 0 (= 
k
k). The rst-order conditions for the problem Xk (0) are
hence a subset of the set of rst-order conditions for the problem Xn (y). Thus ki = 
n
i ,
ki = 
n
i and 
k
i = 
n
i for i < k and 
k
k + 
k
k = 
n
k + 
n
k by the induction assumption.
It remains to show the uniqueness of nk , 
n
k , (U
n
i ; q
n
i ; 
n
i ; 
n
i ; 
n
i )k+1in 1, U
n
n ; q
n
n and
nn + 
n
n: We do this rst for a given bunching pattern. By the latter we mean that the
set B of indices i for which qni = q
n
i+1 holds is xed. The binding incentive constraints ICi
for k < i < n (recall the denition of k and the second part of Lemma 2) give
Uni = U
n
n  
n 1X
j=i
 j
 
qnj+1

(16)
where Unn is by denition the same in all solutions of Xn (y). Since 
n
i = 0 for k < i < n
by assumption, ni for k  i < n and nn+nn are uniquely determined by formula (12) and
depend only on gnk or, equivalently, 
n
k . In particular, 
n
i = fi  gnk . For any i =2 B we have
that MCi is slack, i.e. ni = 0. Partition the set of indices fk + 1;    ; ng into maximally
connected sets J such that the monotonicity constraint is binding for any two adjacent
indices i, i+1 in J . Thus a set J = fi1  i  i2g is in the partition if i1 1; i2 =2 B and for
all i 2 J it holds that (i 2 B , i+ 1 2 J). (Notice that J = fig is a set in the partition
if neither qni 1 = q
n
i nor q
n
i = q
n
i+1.) Summing the rst-order conditions (11) over all i 2 J
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gives the equation X
j2J
 
nj 1 
0
j 1 (q) + sjW
0
j (q))

= 0
in which no non-zero ni occur and from which q
n
i for any i 2 J can be inferred uniquely
from

ni 1
	
i2J and hence g
n
k by the implicit function theorem because the derivative of the
left hand side of the equation is strictly negative with respect to both q and gnk . It follows
moreover that qni is a decreasing function of g
n
k with strictly negative derivative. Starting
with the lowest index in J = fi1  i  i2g one can then infer the ni1 ; ni1+1;    ; ni2 1
inductively from the rst-order conditions (11).
We now claim that the left-hand term in the participation constraint (9) is, with the
variables determined as just described, strictly increasing in gnk . To show this we prove
that its derivative with respect to gnk is strictly positive except in a single point. The
terms on the left-hand side in (9), which depend on gnk , are, using (16) and, once again,
the denition of k and Lemma 4,
nX
i=k+1
si (Wi (q
n
i )  Uni ) =
nX
i=k+1
si
 
Wi (q
n
i )  Unn +
n 1X
j=i
 j
 
qnj+1
!
=
nX
i=k+1
 
si (Wi (q
n
i )  Unn ) + (fi 1   fk) i 1 (qni )

where the last equality follows by collecting terms and using the denition of the cumu-
lative probability fj: Di¤erentiating, and using the equation (11) and that, by gni = g
n
k for
k  i < n and equation (12), ni = fi   gnk = fi   fk + nk for k < i < n, we have (recall
nk = 0.)
nX
i=k+1
 
siW
0
i (q
n
i ) + (fi 1   fk) 0i 1 (qni )
 dqni
dgnk
=
nX
i=k+1
  nk 0i 1 (qni ) + ni   ni 1 dqnidgnk
=  nk
nX
i=k+1
 0i 1 (q
n
i )
dqni
dgnk
 
n 1X
i=k
ni

dqni+1
dgnk
  dq
n
i
dgnk

=  nk
nX
i=k+1
 0i 1 (q
n
i )
dqni
dgnk
> 0
where the last equality follows from nk > 0 and
dqni
dgnk
< 0 for k < i < n: The former is
true whenever gnk < fk (recall (12) and that g
n
k 2 [0; fk]), while the latter is due to the
monotonicity properties of the  i and Wi. Thus the derivative is strictly positive except
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when gnk = fk, which proves our claim. Therefore, there can be at most one value of g
n
k
for which the participation constraint is satised. It follows that there can only be one
solution (including the Lagrange multipliers) for each bunching pattern.
Suppose, nally, that we have two di¤erent solutions to the optimization problem
Xn (y) (excluding the Lagrange multipliers) with possibly di¤erent bunching patterns.
Any convex combination of the two solutions is also a solution because the optimization
problem is convex. Since there are innitely many convex combinations and only nitely
many bunching patterns, we can nd two di¤erent solutions with the same bunching
pattern, which contradicts the above nding. This concludes the proof.
We start with the proof of Theorem 1. In fact, when it comes to the existence proof, we
will prove the more general result that a solution to problem Xn(y) exists for any y  0.
Proof of Theorem 1. We rst prove existence. Denoting a solution to optimization
problem Xn (y) by (Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y))1in, we have the following:
The proof of existence is by induction on the number of types n. Our assumptions
imply that the rst-best level q01 exists and is nite. Moreover, type 1 has a non-negative
utility V1 = W1 (q01) in this mechanism. Therefore a solution exists for n = 1. Suppose
a solution exists for all i = 1;    ; n and that all Vi are non-negative. Then there is a
feasible mechanism for the optimization problem where the most productive type n + 1
gets at least Vn  0. Namely, take an optimal mechanism for type n and extend it such
that type n+1 produces qn+1 = qnn(y) and receives utility Un+1 such that the relevant local
incentive-compatibility constraints are satised, i.e.  n(q
n
n(y))  Un+1   Vn   n(qn+1).
Obviously, this is feasible by the monotonicity property of  n: Consider next a sequence
of feasible mechanisms for which Un+1 converges to the (non-negative) supremum of all
possible values of Un+1 in any feasible mechanism of the problem. Suppose that for some
subsequence the value of qi for some 1  i  n + 1 goes to innity. Then the surplus
Wi (qi) of type i goes to minus innity by assumption. Since all types j = 1;    ; n have
utility at least Vj  0 in each mechanism and since the participation constraint must hold,
Un+1 must go to  1, contradicting Un+1  0. By selecting a subsequence we can assume
that all qi in the sequence converge to a nite value and hence the surplus
Pn+1
i=1 siWi (qi)
converges to a nite value. Because each type j = 1;    ; n has utility at least Vj  0
in each mechanism in the sequence, Un+1 is bounded from above due to the participation
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constraint. Hence a maximizing mechanism exists.
Uniqueness follows from existence and Lemma 5.
We nish with the proof of continuity. Berges maximum theorem implies by induction
that the claims V1;    ; Vn 1 are continuous in the prior. By the same theorem Vn is
continuous and the n-assured allocation upper hemi-continuous. Because the latter is
unique, it is therefore continuous.
The proceed with the following important Lemma:
Lemma 6 The solution ((Uni ; q
n
i ))1in for problem Xn is also a solution to the complete
problem Xn, which therefore exists and is unique.
Proof. To prove this we need to show that the solution ((Uni ; q
n
i ))1in for problem Xn
satises the downward incentive constraints. For type 1  i < n we distinguish two cases:
i) The incentive constraint ICi holds as equality. Then, by using also the monotonicity
constraint MCi we have
Uni = U
n
i+1    i
 
qni+1
  Uni+1    i (qni )
and hence (DCi) is satised.
ii) The ICi holds as a strict inequality (and hence i = 0). Then, by Lemmas 4 and
2, ACi is binding. Therefore, by Lemma 3, and ACi+1 and the denition of Vn = Unn we
have
Uni+1  Vi+1  Vi +  i
 
qii

= Uni +  i
 
qii

Note thus that if qii  qni , then the incentive constraint (DCi) holds. In fact, we show next
that qii = q
n
i . First, we have from Theorem 1 the uniqueness of the solution to problems
Xi and Xn. Second, we have, from Lemma 4 and that ACi is binding, that the solution
to problem Xi is part of the solution to problem Xn, and hence qii = q
n
i .
Thus, the solution ((Uni ; q
n
i ))1in for problem Xn is admissible for problem X

n: Prob-
lemXn is more restricted than problemXn:Hence, existence and uniqueness of the solution
to Xn (Theorem 1) implies existence and uniqueness of the solution to Xn.
We next prove Theorem 2 To do so the following remark is in order.
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Remark 5 In the same fashion, it can be shown that Theorem 1 for problem Xn(y) and
Lemmas 2-5 (all proved earlier in this Appendix) apply to optimization problem ~Xn (y)
as well.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, note from the above Lemma and Lemma 1 that the as-
sured allocation is incentive compatible, and thereby a feasible (deterministic) mechanism.
Suppose now the n-assured allocation is dominated by another mechanism. Then this al-
ternative allocation is also a solution to Xn (0) and hence, by uniqueness (Theorem 1),
identical to the n-assured allocation. The proof of the rst part is complete after setting
n = N .
We prove next the second part of the theorem. After using (with a slight abuse of
notation) Ui = ti 
R
Ci(q)di(q); the incentive-compatibility and participation constraints
can be re-written, respectively, as
Ui  Uj  
j 1X
v=i
Z
 v(q)dj(q) for 1  i < N; i < j  N;
Ui  Uj +
i 1X
v=j
Z
 v(q)dj(q) for 1 < i  N; 1  j < i; (17)
NX
i=1
si(
Z
Wi(q)di(q)  Ui)  0:
Suppose now that the assured allocation ((Ui; qi))1iN does not entail bunching, in
which case it is admissible for the more restricted problem ~XN . By Remark 5, the assured
allocation is thus the unique solution for problem ~XN . The same argument as in the proof
of the rst part of this theorem shows that the assured allocation is undominated within
the class of all deterministic mechanisms where only the agents participation constraint
(PC), the assured claim constraints (ACi) and the upward incentive constraints (ICi) are
imposed (but not the monotonicity constraints MCi).
Consider now a feasible stochastic mechanism ^ =

U^i; ^i (q)

1iN
that satises the
stochastic version of the above constraints, and which dominates the assured allocation.
In particular, any stochastic mechanism satisfying all constraints of (17) could be allowed
for.
Consider the deterministic outputs (q^i)1iN where q^i =
R
qd^i(q):We have by Jensens
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inequality and the strict concavity of Wi(q) that Wi(q^i) >
R
Wi (q) d^i(q): Let
S =
NX
i=1
si

Wi(q^i) 
Z
Wi (q) d^i(q)

=N > 0
be the associated per-type gain in expected surplus. Consider the deterministic mechanism
0 =

U^i + S; q^i

1iN
; which dominates the stochastic mechanism ^ and thereby the
assured allocation. Clearly, the new deterministic mechanism 0 satises by construction
the assured claim constraints and the participation constraint of the agent. From Jensens
inequality and the concavity of  i(q) we have that  i(q^i) 
R
 i (q) d^i(q): Thus, the
mechanism 0 satises also the upward incentive constraints (ICi). It follows that the
unique assured allocation is identical with the mechanism

U^i + S; q^i

1iN
and yields the
same payo¤s for all types of the principal and for the agent as the stochastic mechanism
^: We conclude that the assured allocation is undominated within the class of stochastic
mechanisms.
We now turn to the proofs of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. From the denition of a strong solution and Proposition 2
we know that if the RSW allocation is undominated, it is a strong solution and hence a
strong solution exists. To prove the converse we notice again that the RSW allocation
is safe. It is hence, in the terminology of Myerson (1983), incentive compatible given S
for any subset S of types of the principal. Theorem 1 of Myerson (1983) implies hence
that a strong solution, if it exists, dominates weakly any safe mechanism, in particular
the RSW allocation. Suppose a strong solution exists and strictly dominates the RSW
allocation. Then there exists a type of the principal who does not get in the RSW his
highest possible payo¤ amongst all mechanisms which are incentive compatible and yield
non-negative payo¤s to the agent conditional on every type of the principal. However, this
contradicts the denition of the RSW allocation in Maskin and Tirole (1992), p. 11 (which
appears here as Proposition 1 for convenience). Thus the RSW yields the same payo¤s
for each type of the principal as the given strong solution and is hence undominated.
Proof of Theorem 3. For n = 1; : : : ; N consider the following allocations. Let  
URSWi ; q
RSW
i

1in be the RSW allocation for the restricted typeset f1; : : : ng. Let
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((Uni ; q
n
i ))1in be a solution to the problem Xn. Let

U^ni ; q^
n
i

1in
be the contract
which satises

U^ni ; q^
n
i

=
 
Un 1i ; q
n 1
i

for any 1  i < n and where

U^nn ; q^
n
n

solves the
following optimization problem Zn:
max
(Un;qn)
Un
subject to
Un 1n 1  Un    n 1 (qn) for n > 1
Wn (qn)  Un
We prove by induction over n that a)
 
URSWn ; q
RSW
n

is admissible for the problem Zn and
hence satises URSWn  U^nn ; and b)

U^ni ; q^
n
i

1in
is admissible for the problem Xn and
hence satises that U^nn  Unn = Vn. a) and b) imply directly that URSWn  Vn, which
proves the theorem.
For n = 1 all three solutions coincide and so our claims hold. Suppose that they hold
for n   1  1. To prove claim a) for type n, notice that URSWn 1  U^n 1n 1  Un 1n 1 by our
induction assumption. Recalling that, by denition, URSWn 1  URSWn    n 1(qRSWn ); we
thus have from URSWn 1  Un 1n 1 that
 
URSWn ; q
RSW
n

is admissible for problem Zn. Since U^nn
is the optimal value for problem Zn we have therefore URSWn  U^nn .
We show next that claim b) holds for type n. We notice rst that

U^ni ; q^
n
i

1in
satises all assured claim constraints and all incentive constraints for ProblemXn hold (by
construction of

U^nn ; q^
n
n

and because

U^ni ; q^
n
i

1in 1
is a solution to Xn 1). The ex-
ante participation constraint from problem Xn 1 and the ex post participation constraint
for

U^nn ; q^
n
n

from Problem Zn combined imply that

U^ni ; q^
n
i

1in 1
satises also the
participation constraint of the Problem Xn. As in the proof of Proposition 2 (Appendix
A, top of page 38) in Maskin and Tirole (1992), using thatWn 1
 
qn 1n 1
  Vn 1 = Un 1n 1 by
Lemma 3, one can show for the problem Zn that q^nn 1 < q^
n
n. This, in turn, implies, given
q^ni = q
n 1
i for any 1  i < n; that all monotonicity constraints of the problem Xn are also
satised by the contract

U^ni ; q^
n
i

1in 1
. Hence, the latter contract is admissible for
Xn. Since Unn = Vn is the optimal value for problem Xn we have therefore U^
n
n  Unn = Vn.
This completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 5
Assumption B is required in Theorem 5. We thus show next that Assumptioon B is not
empty.
Lemma 7 A su¢ cient condition for Assumption B is that
W 0i (q)
 0i 1(q)
;
fi 1
si
and
fi 1   fN 1
si
are increasing in i for all q  0:
Proof. We rst show that fi 1 
si
be strictly increasing in i for any  2 [0; fN 1] for
given i; j with j > i: Suppose that sj  si: We then have, by   0 and the assumed
monotonicity of fi 1
si
; that fj 1 
sj
  fi 1 
si
> 0: Suppose now that sj < si:We then have, by
  fn 1 and the assumed monotonicity of fi 1 fN 1si ; that
fj 1 
sj
  fi 1 
si
=
fj 1 fN 1
sj
 
fi 1 fN 1
si
+ (fN 1   )( 1sj   1si ) > 0:
By the rst order conditions for a maximum, qi() is given by
   fi 1
si
=
W 0i (q)
 0i 1(q)
for qi() > 0. Here the left-hand side is constant in q. Because Wi is concave and  i
convex, the quotient on the right-hand side is decreasing in q. As i increases, the left-hand
side shifts downward and the right-hand side upwards. qi () must hence increase.
To prove Theorem 5, we need a number of preliminary results.
We start with the following Lemma, which implies that the solution of Xn(y) is the
solution of ~Xn (y), where, recall, the monotonicity constraints of Xn(y) are ignored.
Lemma 8 Under Assumption B, the monotonicity constraints in problem Xn(y) are slack
(i.e. they could be ignored).
Proof. The proof is by induction on n: For n = 1 there is nothing to show. Suppose the
claim holds for all 1  i < n. Let

~Uni (y) ; ~q
n
i (y)

1in
be the solution of the optimization
problem ~Xn (y) with associated Lagrange multipliers (~i; ~i). Let (U
n
i (y) ; q
n
i (y))1in
be the solution of Xn (y) with associated Lagrange multipliers (i; i; i). Clearly, the
rst-order and complementarity conditions of the problem Xn (y) with i = 0 for all
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0  i  n are identical to the rst-order and complementarity conditions of the prob-
lem ~Xn (y) : Moreover, it is easy to see that the multipliers (~i; ~i)1in and the solution
~Uni (y) ; ~q
n
i (y)

1in
satisfy the rst-order conditions, the complementarity conditions
associated with the incentive-compatibility and assured claim constraints, and the parti-
cipation constraint of the problem Xn (y) ; as long as i = 0 for all i: As we show next,
(~qni (y))1in satisfy also the monotonicity constraints of problem Xn (y) :
Suppose, rst, that none of the assured claim constraints ACi, 1  i < n, are binding
for

~Uni (y) ; ~q
n
i (y)

1in
. Then ~gni (y) =
Pi
j=1 ~j (y) = 0 for all 1  i  n   1 and
hence ~i = fi by equation (12). By the rst-order condition (11) we have ~q
n
i (y) = qi (0)
with qi () as dened prior to Assumption B. By Assumption B we have q1 (0)  q2 (0) 
    qn (0). Secondly, suppose that some assured claim constraint is binding. In this
case, there exists a largest 1  k < n for which ACk is binding. As stated in Remark
5, Lemma 4 is valid. Thus, (~qni (y))1ik is part of the solution for problem ~Xk (0) and
hence ~qn1 (y)  ~qn2 (y)      ~qnk (y) by the induction assumption. By denition of k;
none of the assured claim constraints ACi, k + 1  i < n, are binding, and hence (from
10) ~i = 0 for k + 1  i < n. Thus, ~gni (y) = ~gnk (y), ~i = fi   ~gnk (y) : This implies, by
the rst-order condition corresponding to (11) for ~Xn (y) ; that ~qni (y) = qi (g
n
k (y)) for all
k+1  i  n 1. Together with Assumption B and Lemma 4, the latter and the denition
of k imply that ~qnk (y) < qk+1 (g
n
k (y))  qk+2 (gnk (y))      qn (gnk (y)). Accordingly, in
both cases, we obtain that (~gni (y))1in satises all the monotonicity constraints. Overall,
the solution to ~Xn (y) is hence, by uniqueness (Theorem 1), the solution to Xn (y) : This
completes the proof.
Our last Lemma is:
Lemma 9 Suppose that (Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y))1in is the solution to the optimization problem
~Xn (y). Then
kX
i=1
si (Wi (q
n
i (y))  Uni (y))  0
for any k < n and the restricted solution (Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y))1ik is the solution to ~Xk (y
0) ;
where
y0   
kX
i=1
si
sk
(Wi (q
n
i (y))  Uni (y)) :
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Proof. The inequality follows as in the rst part of the proof of Lemma 4
Moving to the proof of the second part of the Lemma, note rst that
(Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y))1ik is admissible for ~Xk (y
0). Suppose that (Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y))1ik is not
a solution to ~Xk (y0). There is, then, a solution to ~Xk (y0) where type ks utility Ukk is
higher than Unk (y). Therefore,
Ukk > U
n
k (y)  Unk+1 (y)   k
 
qnk+1 (y)

By the maximum theorem we can thus nd a solution to the problem ~Xk (y0   ") with
" > 0, denoted by
  
Uki (y
0   ") ; qki ((y0   "))

1ik, such that U
k
k (y
0   ") > Unk (y) for
su¢ ciently small ": Clearly, Ukk (y
0   ")  Unk+1(y)    k
 
qnk+1(y)

. The new contract
dened by 
U^ni ; q^
n
i

=
8<:
 
Uki (y
0   ") ; qki (y0   ")

for i  k
(Uni (y); q
n
i (y)) for i > k
is thus admissible for problem ~Xn (y) and has a slack participation constraint. The
former is by construction, while the latter follows directly from the denitions of y0 and
(Uni (y); q
n
i (y))1iN and
 
Uki (y
0   ") ; qki (y0   ")

1iN . The new contract is also optimal
since it gives, by construction, utility Unn (y) to type n. This and the slackness of the par-
ticipation constraint, under the new contract, of the problem ~Xn (y) contradict Lemma 2.
We also need Theorem 7 in Myerson (1983), which we state for convenience (in terms
of our set up) next. First, note that an undominated mechanism for weights ( i)1iN is
a feasible mechanism that maximizes
P
i  iUi. Let with some abuse of notation  ij (q) =
Ci (q)  Cj (q) ; that is,  i(q) =  i;i+1(q). We have:
Proposition 4 (Myerson) A feasible mechanism (Ui; qi)1iN is a neutral optimum if
and only if there exist sequences ff i gNi=1; fii0gNi;i0=1;  ; f!i gNi=1gg1=1, with  i > 0; ii0 
0;   0; !i scalars, such that 
 i +
X
j
ij
!
!i  
X
j
ji!

j = 
siV S

i 
 
siWi (q

i ) 
X
j
ji ji (q

i )
!
(18)
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and
lim
!1
sup!i  Ui
where qi ; 

ij; 1  i; j  N; and  are evaluated at the optimal solution of the problem
that determines the undominated allocation for given weights  i ; 1  i  N .
Equation (18) corresponds to equation (8.8) in Myerson (1983). To interpret this
theorem, Myerson refers to (!i )1iN as the warranted claim allocation (for a given ),
and notes that the warranted claim allocation is the utility prole of a strong solution
in an extension of the given model that has more mechanisms available than the original
model. Thus, Theorem 7 in Myerson (1983) states, in e¤ect, that neutral optimum is an
undominated mechanism that dominates the limit of a sequence of abstract mechanisms
that are strong solutions in an extended model which has more mechanisms available than
the original model.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5:
Proof of Theorem 5. We assume that Assumption B holds. Hence, by Lemma 8, any
solution to a problem Xn (y) for any y features output qni (y) which is nondecreasing in i;
and so we can ignore the monotonicity constraints qi  qi+1 in the following. Thus, we
can assume that all multipliers i are zero, and only the multipliers i and i appear in
the Lagrangian for the derivation of the assured allocation.
The virtual surplus associated with this solution is
V Sni (y) =
1
si

ni 1 (y) 
n
i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + siWi (q
n
i (y))

(19)
Corresponding to equation (18) we can dene the warranted claims !ni (y) for problem
Xn (y) inductively over i by
(ni (y) + 
n
i (y))!
n
i (y)  ni 1 (y)!ni 1(y) = siV Sni (y) (20)
Notice that the !ni (y) are uniquely determined by Theorem 1. A solution to the problem
Xn (y) can now overall be described by (Uni (y) ; q
n
i (y) ; 
n
i (y) ; 
n
i (y))1in and has the
assured claims (!ni (y))1in associated with it.
We prove next the following claims for all l  n and all y  0 by induction on n:
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1. !li (y)  U li (y) for 1  i  l.
2. For all 1  i  l we have !ll (0) = Vl. Moreover, !li (y) = Vi for all y  0 whenever
li (y) > 0.
3. A solution to Xl (0) is a neutral optimum for the restricted type set f1;    ; lg.
Note that all these claims are true for any y  0 when n = l = 1: the solution to X1 (0)
is the rst best, hence a strong solution and therefore a neutral optimum according to
Myerson (1983). Therefore (3) holds. Since !11 (y) = W1 (q
1
1 (y))  W1 (q11 (y))+y = U11 (y)
also (1) and the rst part of (2) hold, while the second part is vacuously true.
Let n > 1 and suppose that all three claims hold for all l < n and y  0. We prove
them now for l = n and y = 0.
By Lemma 9 the solution to Xn (0) induces the solution Xn 1 (y) with y determined
by sn 1y =  
Pn 1
i=1 si (Wi (q
n
i (0))  Uni (0))  0: We thus have !ni (0) = !n 1i (y) 
Un 1i (y) = U
n
i (0) for all i < n; after using also claim (1) of the induction assumption
and because we can choose the same Lagrange multipliers in both problems. This proves
claim (1) for y = 0 and all i < l = n:We also have ni (0) = 
n 1
i (y). Hence, we have by a
similar argument !ni (0) = !
n 1
i (y) = Vi for all 1  i < n 1 which satisfy n 1i (y) > 0 by
claim (2) of our induction assumption. If nn 1 (0) > 0; then necessarily y = 0 by Lemmas
2 and 4 and hence !nn 1 (0) = !
n 1
n 1 (0) = Vn 1 again by the induction assumption. This
proves the second part of claim (2) for y = 0 and l = n: Per construction and from the
denition of assured claims for y = 0;
n 1X
i=1
ni (0)!
n
i (0) + (
n
n (0) + 
n
n (0))!
n
n(0) =
nX
i=1
siV S
n
i (0) (21)
Equating the right-hand sides in (7) and (8), which both describe the Lagrangian we
obtain for y = 0
(nn (0) + 
n
n (0))U
n
n (0) =  
n 1X
i=1
ni (0)Vi +
nX
i=1
siV S
n
i (0) (22)
Above we use the complementarity conditions for an optimum to simplify the right-hand
side of (7) and we use the rst order condition (10) to simplify (8), recalling that all i
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are zero. Since Vn = Unn (0) by denition we obtain from (21) and (22)
n 1X
i=1
ni (0)!
n
i (0) + (
n
n (0) + 
n
n (0))!
n
n(0) =
n 1X
i=1
ni (0)Vi + (
n
n (0) + 
n
n (0))Vn
We conclude, after using the second part of claim (2) for y = 0 and i < n, overall that
!nn (0) = Vn = U
n
n (0). This proves claims (1) and the rst part of (2) for y = 0 and
i = l = n:
Next, we construct a sequence (Uni (0; ") ; q
n
i (0; ") ; 
n
i (0; ") ; 
n
i (0; ") ; !
n
i (0; "))1in
for " > 0, lim!1 " = 0 which converges to (Uni (0) ; q
n
i (0) ; 
n
i (0) ; 
n
i (0) ; !
n
i (0))1in
such that the rst-order conditions for the Lagrangian and the complementarity condi-
tions always hold, where the !ni (0; ") are dened as above with respect to the virtual
surplusesV S"i and where 
n
i (0; ") ; 
n
i (0; ")  " . Namely, set " = 1= for any integer
 su¢ ciently large and set ni (0; ") = 
n
i (0) if 
n
i (0) > 0 and 
n
i (0; ") = " otherwise.
Set g"i =
Pi
j=1 
n
j (0; "). Then 
n
i (0; ") = fi   g"i is non-negative for su¢ ciently large
. The qni (0; ") are then uniquely determined by 
n
i 1 (0; ") from the condition (11)
using i = i 1 = 0: The virtual surplusesV S
"
i are then derived from the formula
(19) and the warranted claims !ni (0; ") from (20). Continuity and the uniqueness
of the solution implies as  ! 1 that !ni (0; ") ! !ni (0), ni 1 (0; ") ! ni 1 (0) etc.
The ni (0; ") ; 
n
i (0) and !
n
i (0) etc. play hereby the role of the utility weights 

i ,
lim!1 i , and the warranted allocation !i, etc. in the characterization of neutral optima
in Proposition 4 when the type space is restricted to the types i = 1;    ; n and the prior
for each type is si=fi. Thus, from claim (1) with y = 0 the n-assured allocation is a
neutral optimum by Theorem 7 in Myerson (1983) and so claim (3) holds for l = n.
It remains to show claim (1) and the second part of claim (2) for l = n and y > 0.
Suppose that ni (0) = 0 for any i < n in the solution to Xn (0) : It is immediately seen
that 
Uni (0) +
sny
n
; qni (0) ; 0; 
n
i (0)

1in
is a solution to the problem Xn(y) for all y > 0 because Uni (y) = U
n
i (0) +
sny
n
> Uni (0) 
Vi (and hence ni (y) = 0) for all i  n and (qni (0) ; ni (0))1in satisfy the rst-order
conditions of the problem Xn (y) : Clearly, then, the second part of claim (2) is trivially
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satised and, furthermore, !ni (y) = !
n
i (0) : Thus, given !
n
i (0)  Uni (0) by claim (1) for
y = 0, we have Uni (y) > !
n
i (y) for any y > 0 and i  n.
Suppose next that there is some i < n such that ni (0) > 0 in the solution to Xn (0)
and let k < n be the largest such index. By continuity, as we increase y we will have
nk (y) > 0 in some maximal interval 0  y < y, which can easily be shown to be of nite
length. In this interval we will rst show that all Uni (y) for i > k are strictly increasing in
y. Hence the assured claim constraints Uni (y)  Vi cannot become binding for k < i < n.
At y the largest index k0 for which nk0 (y) > 0 is thus necessarily smaller than k. We will
also show that claim (1) and the second part of claim (2) hold for all 0  y < y: One
can now apply exactly the same arguments on the maximal interval y  y < y0 where
k0 (y) > 0 as on the interval 0  y < y.
Proceeding by induction in this way one will eventually arrive at a level of ~y from
which onwards all ni (y), i < n, are zero. From there onwards a further increase in y does
not a¤ect the multipliers ni (y) ; i < n; anymore, which are now at their maximal value
ni (y) = fi. Hence, neither q
n
i (y) nor the virtual surpluses nor !
n
i (y) change as y increases.
Only the Uni (y) are increased, all in the same way because all incentive constraints ICi
are binding (recall Lemma 2). Thus, once all ni (y) are zero for i < n they remain so for
all y0  y; and if !ni (y)  Uni (y) holds in addition, this remains so for all y0  y. Hence,
claim (1) and the second part of (2) hold for all y  y if they hold for y < y.
To complete, given this outline, the proof, we now show (a) that Uni (y) ; for i > k;
are strictly increasing in y; and (b) that claim (1) and the second part of (2) hold for all
0  y < y.
Since Unk (y) = Vk in the solution to Xn (y), for all 0  y < y, the solution in question
induces by Lemma 4 the solution to Xk (0) ; and so we have !ni (y) = !
k
i (0)  Uki (0) =
Uni (y) for all 0  y < y and i  k. Moreover, Uni (y) = Uki (0) = Vi = !ki (0) = !ni (y) for
all i  k which satisfy ki (0) = ni (y) > 0, in particular for i = k. Thus, claim (1) and the
second part of (2) are proved in the interval for all i  k. None of these variables change as
we vary y in the interval. Since, by Lemma 4, nl (y) = fl  gnk (y) = fl  gnk 1 (0) nk (y) ;
a marginal change in y a¤ects nk (y) and thereby a¤ects all 
n
l (y), l  k, in the same way,
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i.e.
dnl
dy
=
dnj
dy
=  d
n
k
dy
for all l; j  k
We abbreviate d
dy
=
dnl
dy
for l  k. All incentive constraints ICl must be binding for l > k
by Lemma 2. Therefore, Unl (y) = U
n
k (y) +
Pl
i=k+1  i 1 (q
n
i (y)). When we now slightly
increase y we obtain
dUnl (y)
dy
=
lX
i=k+1
 0i 1 (q
n
i (y))
dqni (y)
dy
The rst-order condition for qni (y) is 
n
i 1 (y) 
0
i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + siW
0
i (q
n
i (y)) = 0. Di¤erenti-
ation yields
d
dy
 0i 1 (q
n
i (y)) +

ni 1 (y) 
00
i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + siW
00
i (q
n
i (y))
 dqni (y)
dy
= 0
dqni (y)
dy
=    
0
i 1 (q
n
i (y))
ni 1 (y) 
00
i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + siW
00
i (q
n
i (y))
d
dy
;
which has the same sign as d=dy by the second-order conditions, and hence
dUnl (y)
dy
=
 
 
lX
i=k+1
 
 0i 1 (q
n
i (y))
2
ni 1 (y) 
00
i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + siW
00
i (q
n
i (y))
!
d
dy
where the term in brackets is positive. For l = n we obtain d
dy
> 0 since an increase in y
slackens the participation constraint and hence Unn (y) must increase. (Formally
dUnn (y)
dy
> 0
follows by applying the envelope theorem to the Lagrangian.) We see, in turn, that all
Unl (y) are strictly increasing for all 0  y < y and k < l < n: Therefore, all assured claim
constraints remain slack. In particular, ni (y) = 0 for all i > k and, hence, the second
part of claim (2) is proved for all 0  y < y and 1  i < l = n.
We continue with the proof of claim (1). For l > k we have for the assured claims34
nl (y)!
n
l (y)  nk (y)!nk (y) =
lX
i=k+1

ni 1 (y) i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + siWi (q
n
i (y))

34For this calculation it is convenient to set nn (y) = 0.
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We obtain
d
dy
[nl (y)!
n
l (y)  nk (y)!nk (y)] =
d
dy
(!nl (y)  !nk (y)) + nl (y)
d!nl
dy
=
"
lX
i=k+1
 i 1 (q
n
i (y))
#
d
dy
where the rst and second term are equal because !nk (y) = Vk is constant in y while the
rst and the third term are equal by the product rule and by using the rst order condition
for qni (y) maximizing the virtual surplus. Therefore
d!nl
dy
=
"
lX
i=k+1
 i 1 (q
n
i (y)) + !
n
k (y)  !nl (y)
#
d
dy
=nl (y)
Since !nk (y) = U
n
k (y) ; by the second part of claim (2) and because U
n
k (y) = Vk, and
Unl (y) = U
n
k (y) +
Pl
i=k+1  i 1 (q
n
i (y)) by the incentive constraints, it follows that
d!nl
dy
= (Unl (y)  !nl (y))
d
dy
=nl (y) :
The proof is now concluded by showing the following statement to be true.
Consider the maximal interval [0; y) of all values of y for which nk (y) > 0. Then
!nl (y)  Unl (y) for all l > k and for all y in this interval.
The proof of the statement is by contradiction. Suppose Unl (y) < !
n
l (y) for some
0  y < y. Let y^ = inf fyjUnl (y) < !nl (y)g. For y = y^ we have Unl (y) = !nl (y) because
both functions are continuous and Unl (0)  !nl (0). Hence d!
n
l
dy jy=y^ = 0. Since
dUnl
dy
> 0 we
have
d(Unl  !nl )
dy jy=y^ > 0. It follows that U
n
l (y) > !
n
l (y) for all small y > y^, in contradiction
to the denition of y^.
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